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TO ARM OR TO ALLY? 
THE PATRON’S DILEMMA AND THE STRATEGIC LOGIC OF ARMS 
TRANSFERS AND ALLIANCES 
 
Keren Yarhi-Milo, Alexander Lanoszka, and Zack Cooper1 
 
Under what conditions do great power patrons give client states alliances, arms, or both? Why do 
great powers sometimes provide arms to their clients and why do they sometimes form alliances 
with their clients?  
 These questions are important in international politics because great powers face a 
“patron’s dilemma.” Great powers must adopt policies to provide security to their allies without 
becoming entrapped in an unwanted conflict. Strong commitments, such as treaty alliances, 
worsen the risk of entrapment—that is, the patron’s fear of being dragged into an undesirable 
war. Weak commitments, such as verbal assurances, intensify fears of abandonment—that is, the 
client’s fear of receiving inadequate support should a crisis develop. Such is the traditional 
alliance dilemma.2  
                                                        
1 Keren Yarhi-Milo is an Assistant Professor of Politics and International Affairs at Princeton University’s Politics 
Department and the Woodrow Wilson School for Public and International Affairs. Alexander Lanoszka is lecturer in 
the Department of International Politics at City, University of London. Zack Cooper is a fellow at the Center for 
Strategic and International Studies. For their insights and suggestions, the authors thank the editors of International 
Security, the anonymous reviewers, and Thomas Christensen, Timothy Crawford, Avery Goldstein, Joseph Grieco, 
Robert Jervis, Benjamin Miller, Jeremy Pressman, and participants in the international relations seminars at 
Columbia University and Lehigh University. 
2 Glenn Snyder, Alliance Politics (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1997).  
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Grasping the patron’s dilemma is central to understanding not only U.S. security 
commitments, but also many related patterns of interstate behavior. Efforts to secure an Iranian 
nuclear deal have produced calls for stronger defense ties between the United States and Israel, 
Saudi Arabia, and the United Arab Emirates, among others. Such ties could include formal treaty 
alliances or the sale of additional arms. Experts warn that insufficient assurances could trigger 
nuclear proliferation or even regional war. Elsewhere in the world, China’s assertiveness has 
made U.S. allies, such as Japan and the Philippines, and partners, such as Vietnam and Taiwan, 
anxious. This alliance anxiety has forced the United States to reconsider its provision of arms 
and alliances. Similar issues are at play with Ukraine. Russian aggression toward Eastern Europe 
has fueled debate about whether existing U.S. security guarantees are sufficient and whether 
Ukraine should receive lethal U.S. arms. In all these regions, we expect the patron’s dilemma to 
remain intense. Our article elucidates the choices and constraints facing decisionmakers 
managing this dilemma. 
The decisions of great powers to transfer arms or form alliances often present intriguing 
empirical puzzles. In 2015, the United States supported thirty-two treaty allies and allocated 
billions in security assistance worldwide. Surprisingly, U.S. treaty allies received only 2 percent 
of all U.S. foreign military financing, whereas five non-allied countries received over 90 percent. 
Among this group of five non-allied U.S. partners, Israel received $3.1 billion (55 percent of U.S. 
foreign military financing), Egypt $1.3 billion (23 percent), Jordan $300 million (5 percent), 
Pakistan $280 million (5 percent), and Iraq $250 million (5 percent).3 This variation is even more 
intriguing when considered historically. During the Cold War, the United States provided 
                                                        
3 “Foreign Military Financing Account Summary,” U.S. Department of State, 2015, 
http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm. 
   2 
weapons and alliances to many states, including Pakistan and Taiwan, but transferred arms to 
Israel without a formal defense pact. Yet Pakistan and Taiwan eventually lost their alliances 
despite seeing U.S. arms transfers continue, if not increase. Why did the United States modulate 
its arms and alliances provision during the Cold War? And why would it today decline to offer 
some states defense pacts but give them more military financing than its treaty allies? 
 A patron’s choice to provide arms, alliances, or both, raises academic questions because 
extending alliances and transferring arms produce many similar benefits. Both policies are useful 
for deterring adversaries and reassuring clients while exerting some influence over them. 
Alliances strengthen deterrence and defense by aggregating capabilities and enhancing combined 
operations and planning. Arms transfers deter and defend by altering the local military balance. 
Like alliances, arms transfers can signal a patron’s commitment to maintain its client’s security. 
Still, the conditions under which major power patrons transfer arms and extend defense pacts 
have been under-examined. Prominent scholars have argued that U.S. military assistance to 
clients is driven by nonstrategic calculations, such as domestic political factors or commercial 
motivations.4 
 In this article, we offer a unified strategic logic that explains how patrons calibrate the 
provision of these security goods. We argue that patrons primarily make such decisions on the 
                                                        
4 For domestic political explanations, see Galen Jackson, “The Showdown That Wasn’t: US-Israeli Relations and 
American Domestic Politics, 1973-1975,” International Security, vol. 39, no. 4 (2015): 130-169. See also John J. 
Mearsheimer and Stephen M. Walt, The Israel Lobby and US Foreign Policy (New York, NY: Farrar, Straus and 
Giroux, 2008); Edward Tivnan, The Lobby: Jewish Political Power and American Foreign Policy (New York, NY: 
Simon and Schuster, 1987); Robert H. Trice, Interest Groups and the Foreign Policy Process: U.S. Policy in the 
Middle East (Beverly Hills, CA: Sage, 1976); and Mitchell Geoffrey Bard, The Water’s Edge and Beyond: Defining 
the Limits to Domestic Influence on United States Middle East Policy (New Brunswick, NJ: Transaction, 1991). For 
explanations based on commercial motivations see Lawrence Freedman, “IV: Britain and the Arms Trade,” 
International Affairs, vol. 54, no. 1 (1978): 377-392. On a mixture of motives, see Edward A. Kolodziej, “France 
and the Arms Trade,” International Affairs, vol. 56, no. 1 (1980): 54-72.  
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basis of two factors: first, the extent to which the patron believes it and the client have common 
security interests; and second, whether the patron believes that the client has sufficient military 
capabilities to deter its main adversary and prevail should deterrence fail. These two variables 
interact to shape the bundle of security commitments the patron offers to its client. Our analysis 
reveals when patrons use security goods as substitutes and complements.5 We shed light on how 
patrons manage the alliance dilemma by using arms transfers to affect the behavior of their 
clients. We show that such tools can improve reassurance and mitigate abandonment fears by 
complementing existing alliances while minimizing entrapment risks. Simply put, the patron’s 
dilemma relates to how best to use arms transfers to address the alliance dilemma. 
 Our theoretical framework builds upon previous work regarding how great powers 
calibrate the provision of security goods to serve their interests while managing their clients’ 
behavior.6 We extend this approach by showing how security commitments change over time. In 
so doing, we show how decisionmakers concerned with entrapment take measures to mitigate 
such concerns. Our analysis thus challenges the notion that clients can entrap patrons that are 
providing arms rather than alliances. Using primary documents, we assess how decisionmakers 
regard the risks and opportunities that come with providing arms and alliances. 
 Our empirical findings provide weak evidence for claims that domestic politics and 
commercial interests explain patrons’ decisions to transfer arms or form alliances. Rather, our 
evidence strongly suggests that even in controversial cases where such alternative explanations 
                                                        
5 On foreign policy substitution, see T. Clifton Morgan and Glenn Palmer, “Selecting the Right Tools for the 
Job(s),” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 44, No. 1 (2000): 11-32; Benjamin A. Most and Harvey Starr, 
“International Relations Theory, Foreign Policy Substitutability, and “Nice” Laws,” World Politics, Vol. 36, No. 3 
(1984): 383-406. 
6 David Lake, Entangling Relations: American Foreign Policy in its Century (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University 
Press, 1999). 
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are plausible, strategic variables are more salient to U.S. decisionmakers. We do not dismiss the 
importance of these alternative explanations, but instead show how U.S. decisionmakers focused 
primarily on the commonality of security interests and the local military balance in determining 
what bundles of military assistance to give to client states. 
 More broadly, our argument advances a growing literature on interstate signaling by 
examining the conditions under which arms transfers and alliances serve as alternative or 
complementary costly signals of support to a client. Of course, patrons can use other goods (e.g., 
forward deployments and joint military exercises) to further their clients’ security interests. We 
focus on arms transfers and alliances, however, because both can be described as distinct signals 
of patron support with separate cost structures. Alliances reflect ex post costs whereas arms 
transfers hinge on the logic of ex ante sunk costs. Our theory and empirical analysis 
demonstrates how variation in these cost structures explains utilization of these policies, and how 
leaders perceive the relative utility of these tools.7 
 We proceed as follows. The first section reviews existing conceptualizations of arms and 
alliances. The second section describes our theory. The third section discusses our research 
design and reviews the two main alternative arguments: domestic political and commercial 
explanations. The fourth and fifth sections study U.S. efforts to provide arms and alliances to 
Taiwan and Israel, respectively. The sixth section concludes and outlines policy implications. 
Alliances and Arms: A Theoretical Overview 
                                                        
7 Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, “Signaling Alliance Commitments: Hand-Tying and Sunk Costs in 
Extended Nuclear Deterrence,” American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 58, No. 4 (2014): 919-935. 
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Instead of asking when states respond to a threat by choosing between alliances and self-
armament, we consider What factors, from the perspective of a great power patron, determine 
whether to support a potential client through an alliance commitment or through arms transfers. 
Whatever the trade-offs involved, we explain the extent to which both security goods serve 
similar functions, and how differences between them shape when each is selected. Below we 
consider each security good in turn. 
ALLIANCE COMMITMENTS  
Alliances are written pledges between two or more states that are intended to formalize some 
form of security cooperation.8 In this article, we set aside offensive alliances and non-aggression 
pacts to focus on defensive alliances (or defense pacts), in which members pledge to come to 
each other’s aid in the event of external aggression. Alliances deter adversaries by aggregating 
and, through joint military exercises and operational planning, enhancing capabilities. Alliances 
are ex post commitments that bolsters the credibility of promises to intervene by implicating a 
state’s reputation for reliability to its actions.9 Reneging on commitments is costly because it 
affects a state’s ability to negotiate future alliance treaties.10 
                                                        
8 On alliances as a bundle of some mixture of security goods, see Matthew Fuhrmann and Todd S. Sechser, 
“Signaling Alliance Commitments.” For alliances as written pledges, see James Morrow, “Alliances: Why Write 
Them Down?” Annual Review of Political Science, Vol. 3 (2000): 63-83. 
9 James D. Fearon, “Signaling Foreign Policy Interests: Tying Hands versus Sinking Costs,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 41, No. 1 (1997): 68-90. Some but not all formal alliance commitments also feature extensive 
military cooperation and coordination,. Indeed, many alliances include few signals of commitment beyond verbal 
promises. Sechser and Fuhrmann, “Signaling Alliance Commitments.”  
10 See Douglas M. Gibler, “The Costs of Reneging: Reputation and Alliance Formation,” Journal of Conflict 
Resolution, Vol. 52, No. 3 (2008): 426-454; Mark J.C. Crescenzi, Jacob D. Kathman, Katja B. Kleinberg, and 
Reed M. Wood, “Reliability, Reputation, and Alliance Formation,” International Studies Quarterly, Vol. 56, No. 
2 (2012): 259-274; and Gregory Miller, The Shadow of the Past: Reputation and Military Alliances Before the 
First World War (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 2012).  
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States face a dilemma in deciding the strength of their alliance commitments. Too weak a 
commitment could embolden an adversary and inspire abandonment fears in an ally because the 
patron might decline to assist it during a crisis. Too strong a commitment, however, such as one 
that is explicit, broad, and binding, could embolden a client to pursue risky or aggressive policies. 
This latter worry reflects a patron’s fear of being militarily entrapped by a risk-taking ally that 
could drag the patron into an unwanted war.11 Of course, all alliance commitments imply some 
risk of entanglement, which Tongfi Kim defines as “the process whereby a state is compelled to 
aid an ally in a costly and unprofitable enterprise because of the alliance.”12 
Institutional arrangements sometimes enable the patron to mitigate this entanglement risk. 
Ambiguous commitments can make both clients and adversaries cautious because they are 
unsure which obligations and conditions would trigger an alliance response.13 Defense pacts are 
unconditional if they leave unspecified the terms under which the patron would aid its client. 
Defense pacts are conditional if they attach public or private terms or ambiguous language 
designed to reduce an ally’s moral hazard.14 These arrangements are imperfect, however. For 
example, determining whether an attack was provoked can be difficult, thereby calling into 
question the applicability of a conditional defense pact. Accordingly, conditional alliances can 
undercut deterrence if a potential adversary believes that it can circumvent a great power’s 
alliance commitments.15 
                                                        
11 See Michael Beckley, “The Myth of Entangling Alliances: Reassessing the Security Risks of U.S. Defense Pacts,” 
International Security, vol. 39, no. 4 (2015): 7–48. 
12 Emphasis in original. Tongfi Kim, “Why Alliances Entangle But Seldom Entrap States,” Security Studies, vol. 20, 
no. 3 (2011): 3555.   
13 Beckley, “Myth.” 
14 Brett V. Benson, Constructing International Security: Alliances, Deterrence, and Moral Hazard (Cambridge, UK: 
Cambridge University Press, 2012): 99-100.  
15 Snyder, Alliance Politics. 
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ARMS TRANSFERS  
Arms transfers refer to weapons that states give each other to augment their military capabilities. 
Like alliances, arms transfers deter and defend by shifting the local balance of power in the 
recipient’s favor. Yet arms transfers differ from alliances in three ways. First, a patron can decide 
to transfer arms quickly and sometimes without involving domestic legislatures, whereas 
alliances often take time to negotiate and ratify. Second, a patron can modulate the magnitude 
and type of military assistance it provides over time. Alliance commitments are generally more 
static and difficult to calibrate. Third, although alliances are mainly an ex post indicator of 
commitment, arm transfers are primarily an ex ante signal of commitment—the costs of which 
result from supplying credit to purchase or granting a weapons shipment.16 
 Arms transfers can signal a patron’s intentions by demonstrating its interest in 
maintaining the security of its client. Three characteristics of arms transfers affect their signaling 
value. The first characteristic is the size of the arms transfer. A large transfer can function as a 
sunk cost. Such  costly signals cause a client and its adversary to reason that only a patron with a 
strong interest in maintaining the security of its client would significantly augment its arsenal. 
We define the size of an arms transfer as the percentage of the patron’s total military transfer 
budget devoted to a certain client relative to other regional clients.17 
The second characteristic concerns the type of weapons being transferred. Defensive 
weapons limit the client’s ability to conquer territory or to launch a first strike. By contrast, 
                                                        
16 If the arms transfer comprises advanced weapons, then the patron might have to bear not only a budgetary burden 
but also some risk of undesirable technological transfer to the client. Such technological spillover could make the 
client less dependent on the patron for arms in the future, thereby depriving the patron of leverage. 
17 See http://www.state.gov/t/pm/ppa/sat/c14560.htm. Arms transfers may be a substitute for crisis intervention 
should hostilities between the client and the adversary breakout. Yet it remains unclear how the patron can remain 
neutral and not be dragged into an undesirable conflict. 
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offensive weapons that (those that favor mobility over protection or firepower) constitute a more 
costly signal.18 The adversary might even regard the patron’s willingness to supply offensive 
weapons as a signal that the patron approves of a client’s offensive aims. The adversary and 
other outside observers are therefore likelier to believe that the patron will come to its client’s aid 
in a crisis. Alternatively, whatever the patron’s intentions, an adversary might blame the patron 
for providing weapons that enabled its client to undertake offensive operations, thereby 
implicating the patron in the conflict and increasing the likelihood that the adversary will target 
the patron.19 Transferring offensive weapons to a client thus means that the patron is accepting a 
higher risk of entrapment. 
The third characteristic of arms transfers is institutionalization. The more institutionalized 
the practice of transferring arms, the stronger its signaling value. A single arms transfer is an 
ambiguous signal of a client’s future commitment because it provides limited information about 
the patron’s future behavior. More institutionalized arrangements produce expectations of future 
weapons transfers, increase the anticipated cost of the client’s commitment to the patron and the 
anticipated benefit to the client, and are much harder to reverse. With institutionalization, the 
patron is more likely to suffer reputation costs if its client is defeated. At stake is not the patron’s 
reputation for resolve but rather the patron’s desire to be seen as being on the winning side. 
Institutionalized arms transfers can take many forms. Patrons might commit to provide a certain 
amount or type of arms within a specified time frame. Alternatively, patrons might offer some 
guarantee that their clients maintain a sufficient self-defense capability. By creating expectations 
                                                        
18 Some offensive weapons are indistinguishable from defensive ones. In such cases, the signaling logic of arms 
transfers might be less pronounced compared to cases where unambiguously offensive weapons are supplied.   
19 Sophistication might be another criterion. The more technologically sophisticated the weapon—operationalized by 
measuring the time passed since its initial fielding--the stronger the signal. Newer weapons are often qualitatively 
superior and may embolden the client. We omit this category because newer weapons are often more expensive and 
thus costly.  
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of future arms transfers, institutionalization provides a new focal point for relations between the 
patron and client. Thus, arms transfers convey the most significant and costliest signal of a 
patron’s support when they include institutionalized provision of a large quantity of offensive 
and defensive weapons.20 Costly arm transfers have at least two of these characteristics. When 
arms transfers are ad hoc and feature small quantities of defensive weapons, we argue that the 
signal conveys insignificant support. 
This conceptualization of arms transfers covers multiple methods of provision, including 
sales, grants, and loans. Although the payment mechanisms may differ, each type of arms 
transfer requires a similar set of decisions by the patron’s’ leaders. In the United States, for 
example, foreign military sales and financing are both governed by the Arms Export Control Act, 
determined by the secretary of state, and executed by the secretary of defense. The president 
must formally decide that providing arms will “strengthen the security of the United States and 
promote world peace.”21 The central policy questions are similar even though the exact structure 
of each arms transfer arrangement may differ. 
Arms transfers have disadvantages that limit their deterrence, defense, and signaling 
value. First, arms transfers provide a quick solution to slight shifts in the local conventional 
military balance, but they cannot rapidly induce large changes in a client’s wartime military 
capabilities relative to a much more powerful adversary. The supply of arms is unlikely to 
achieve similar battlefield results as fighting alongside a major power. When the client faces a 
                                                        
20Arms transfers sometimes create reputation costs. An illustrative example is the alleged use by insurgents in 
eastern Ukraine of Russian anti-aircraft missiles against flight MH17. This accident hurt Russia’s reputation and led 
to economic sanctions. Suspending arms transfers during a crisis could also create reputation costs. The United 
States risks appearing unreliable if it suspends military aid to Israel during a conflict. 
21 See “Foreign Military Financing,” Defense Security Cooperation Agency, accessed December 31, 2015, 
http://www.dsca.mil/programs/foreign-military-financing-fmf; “Foreign Military Sales,” Defense Security 
Cooperation Agency, accessed December 31, 2015, http://www.dsca.mil/programs/foreign-military-financing-fms. 
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significant disadvantage and thus cannot deter or defend against an adversary, the transfer of 
weapons might be insufficient to turn the tide of a conflict, but it could buy the client some time 
while the patron decides whether and how to intervene. A second limitation is that ex ante arms 
transfers do not constitute a promise to rescue the client in a militarized crisis, though they could 
entangle a patron perceived as complicit in a conflict. Although the steady supply of significant 
military arms could establish the perception of a close partnership between the patron and the 
client, such partnerships typically do not include an explicit commitment to support the client in 
wartime. Therefore, relative to formal alliance commitments, even significant arms transfers are 
unlikely to entrap a patron concerned about its reputation.  
Theoretical Framework 
To highlight the patron’s dilemma, and to explain the complementarity and substitutability of 
arms transfers and alliances, we offer a new theoretical framework. Building on the realist 
observation that threat perceptions drive alliance formation, our theory emphasizes two 
independent variables, both of which are perceptual. The first independent variable is the 
patron’s assessment of the commonality of security interests with its potential client. The second 
is the patron’s assessment of the client’s military capabilities relative to its shared adversary.22 
We argue that patrons assess these two variables in turn. A patron first reviews the commonality 
of security interests with a potential client to determine whether an alliance is desirable. Then the 
patron decides whether to transfer arms depending on the client’s perceived military capabilities 
relative to a shared adversary. Although we focus on these two strategic variables, we also 
discuss the importance of other factors such as domestic politics and commercial interests. 
                                                        
22 Stephen Walt, The Origin of Alliances (Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, 1987). 
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Commonality of security interests refers to the extent of the threat that the client’s 
primary adversary poses to the patron’s core security interests. This variable is perceptual 
because it depends on decisionmakers’ threat assessments. In situations of high compatibility the 
patron must determine whether its client’s severest security threat also poses a significant threat 
to the patron’s core security interests. The patron must also determine whether the client is in an 
adversarial relationship with a third country with which the patron has an alliance or wishes to 
improve diplomatic relations. If the client is not in an adversarial relationship, then the security 
interests of the patron and the client will be highly compatible, making the patron likelier to sign 
a formal defense pact with its client than not. Even when interests might be harmonious in theory, 
a formal alliance is attractive for clarifying the deterrent signal for adversaries, protecting the 
alliance from changes in government, and facilitating military-to-military cooperation in 
peacetime.23 In such situations, the patron will regard such a commitment as enhancing its own 
security and will be less concerned with entrapment.24 An example of a patron and a client 
exhibiting highly compatible security interests is the case of the United States and West 
Germany. Both countries saw the Soviet Union and its allies as their principal adversaries during 
the Cold War and West Germany did not face another significant adversary. 
In relationships with limited compatibility, the primary threat confronting the client does 
not appear to pose a threat to the security interests of the patron. Divergences in security threats 
are also significant for the patron when the enemy of its friend is also its friend, thereby 
complicating the making of a general hand-tying commitment. All else equal, we expect 
alliances that are based on some degree of common interests to exhibit a lower level of 
                                                        
23 Relatively strong patrons can also better deter adversaries from attacking its allies. See Paul Huth, “Extended 
Deterrence and the Outbreak of War,” American Political Science Review, vol. 82, no. 2 (1988): 423-443. 
24 Of course, major powers have more interests than their weaker allies, but they can still prioritize threats similarly. 
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commitment compared with those based on high commonality, because the patron prefers not to 
be involved directly in the disputes that the client has with those unshared adversaries. In such 
situations, an unconditional formal defense treaty between a patron and a client is very 
unlikely.25 An example of a security relationship with limited compatibility is that between the 
United States and Saudi Arabia. Although Iranian nuclear capabilities have long concerned the 
United States, Saudi Arabia has significant security concerns that the United States does not 
share, including Israel. Consequently, no formal U.S.-Saudi defense treaty exists.26 
 A client’s military capabilities are the second independent variable. The patron evaluates 
whether the client can effectively deter an attack from the client’s main adversary, and prevail 
militarily if deterrence fails. In this situation, the patron conducts a net assessment that combines 
quantitative measurements and qualitative indicators to infer the strength of the opposing 
militaries. It must consider dynamic and contextual factors that affect the client’s capabilities in 
both the present and the short-term future. When the client enjoys a favorable military balance, a 
transfer of arms could encourage the client to undertake offensive operations. In such situations, 
particularly when the patron and client have a formal alliance, the patron is unlikely to transfer 
arms that could embolden its client and thereby entrap the patron. When the client’s military 
capabilities are low relative to its adversary, however, arms transfers could enhance the client’s 
deterrence and defense capabilities while signaling the patron’s support. An example of a client 
                                                        
25 Benson, Constructing International Security. 
26 To be exhaustive, consider a situation of zero compatibility. The patron could offer at best a weak commitment to 
the potential client in return for something that the patron values. Yet such commitments should be empirically rare. 
Our theory cannot explain such alliances given its emphasis on shared threat assessments.  
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with high (conventional) military capabilities is South Korea relative to North Korea. An 
example of a client with low military capabilities is Taiwan relative to China.27 
Before describing the predicted outcomes generated by interacting these two variables, 
we must clarify our assumptions. First, we assume that the patron always wants to preserve the 
status quo between the client and the client’s adversary. Indeed, the patron faces an optimization 
problem: it wants to deter an adversary from challenging the client (and ensure the client’s 
ability to prevail if deterrence fails) but at the lowest possible cost. Second, we assume that the 
client wants to extract the greatest commitment possible from its patron, regardless of the form it 
takes.28  
                                                        
27 Scott L. Kastner, “Is the Taiwan Strait Still a Flash Point? Rethinking the Prospects for Armed Conflict between 
China and Taiwan,” International Security, vol. 40, no. 3 (2016): 54–92. 
28 Admittedly, clients might have domestic reasons that could, for example, lead them to prefer arms to a formal 
alliance. Admittedly, clients might have domestic reasons that could, for example, lead them to prefer arms to a 
formal alliance. For example, McManus and Yarhi-Milo show that the United States is less likely to provide highly 
public signals of support to its more autocratic clients due to fears of domestic backlash in both the United States 
and the client country. Roseanne W. McManus and Keren Yarhi-Milo. 2016. “The Logic of ‘Backstage’ Signaling: 
Domestic Politics, Regime Type, and Major Power-Protégé Relations,” Working paper. 
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Table 1. The Patron’s Dilemma 
 
patron’s assessment of client’s relative current and projected 
military capability vis-à-vis adversary  
unfavorable favorable 
patron’s 
assessment of 
commonality 
of security 
interests 
highly 
compatible  
provision of both costly arms 
and defense pact 
 provision of defense pact 
without costly arms 
 somewhat 
compatible 
provision of costly arms 
without unconditional 
defense pact  
provision of neither costly 
arms nor defense pact 
 
Table 1 displays our four predicted outcomes. Consider first the situation in which the patron 
perceives highly compatible security interests but the client faces an unfavorable local military 
balance (the top-left cell). Because their security interests overlap and the client needs military 
assistance, the patron will provide both costly arms and a defense pact. In this scenario, a defense 
pact is desirable because it issues a strong deterrent signal to adversaries, facilitates military-to-
military coordination, and sustains the partnership against changes in government. Arms 
transfers bolster the deterrent value of the alliance—which by itself is a piece of paper—by 
making the ally more capable of at least holding off potential aggressors until reinforcements 
arrive.29  
                                                        
29 James D. Morrow, “Alliances, Credibility, and Peacetime Costs,” Journal of Conflict Resolution, Vol. 38, No. 2 
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The second situation involves highly compatible security interests but a military balance 
that favors the client rather than the adversary (the top-right cell). In this scenario, the patron 
would still provide or maintain an alliance commitment to deter the common adversary. The 
alliance offers some leverage over the client and a hedge in case the client’s relative military 
advantage suddenly deteriorates. Although alliances carry some costs and risks, they remain 
more cost-effective way of thwarting aggression against the client than having to intervene on 
behalf of a non-treaty security partner should local deterrence fail. To minimize moral hazard, 
however, the patron could add conditions to the alliance to ensure that it is only activated 
following an unambiguous attack on the client. For the client, notwithstanding its relative 
military preponderance vis-à-vis the adversary, an alliance with the patron remains attractive 
because it enhances deterrence, reduces the risk of a simultaneous attack by multiple adversaries, 
and lowers the overall cost of providing for its own defense by way of burden-sharing. 
Nevertheless, for the patron, providing costly arms is redundant and even dangerous because it 
could encourage the client to press its claims against the adversary.30  
The next two situations occur when the patron and the client have only somewhat 
compatible security interests. Despite the lack of common security interests, the patron does not 
wish to leave the client vulnerable. Accordingly, it will forgo an unconditional defense pact to 
avoid getting entrapped in conflict with unshared enemies. If it were to offer a commitment, then 
it would at most be a highly conditional defense pact so as to reduce these dangers. Nevertheless, 
designing conditional defense pacts is difficult because clarifying the terms of assistance could 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(1994): 270-297. 
30 The patron might still choose to supply some arms occasionally to maintain the client’s deterrent capability, 
ensure interoperability should deterrence fail, and allow time to come to the client’s defense. We do not expect the 
provision of costly arms in this scenario, so institutionalized provisions of a large amount of offensive weapons are 
unlikely.  
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invite either the client or the adversary to skirt the treaty. Moreover, they are difficult to 
implement because it is often unclear which state was the primary aggressor. Adversaries might 
still find conditional alliances threatening. Consequently, the patron could abrogate the alliance 
altogether to reassure the courted adversary.31 
Whether the patron transfers costly arms in these two situations will depend on its 
assessments of the client’s military capabilities. When the patron concludes that the military 
balance in unfavorable to the client (the bottom-left cell), the patron is likely to send costly arms 
to enable the client to deter its main adversary. If the patron desires cooperative relations with 
that particular adversary, then relying on arms transfers can also signal continued diplomatic 
support without a commitment to intervene militarily. Still, the patron will likely prefer to 
transfer weapons that would reduce instability and thus potential entrapment risks, thereby 
supplying defensive rather than offensive weapons.32 The resulting ambiguity still has deterrent 
value: potential challengers might refrain from attacking if they are uncertain of how the patron 
will aid the client. Moreover, the relative flexibility of arms transfers is advantageous for the 
patron when it desires the cooperation of both its client and that client’s adversary. By providing 
arms to both parties, the patron could extract mutual concessions and create strategic ambiguity 
about which side it would support in a crisis, thereby decreasing the chance for war.33 
Finally, if the patron and client have somewhat compatible security interests and the 
patron assesses that the military balance is favorable to the client (the bottom-right cell), costly 
                                                        
31 Glenn Snyder, “The Security Dilemma in Alliance Politics,” World Politics, vol. 36, no. 4 (1984): 471. 
32 The patron could also attach end-use agreements to provisions of arms so as to clarify that it would not tolerate 
their use against a particular target state. However, clients can violate such agreements during crises. Verifying any 
violations could also be difficult. 
33 Timothy W. Crawford, Pivotal Deterrence: Third-Party Statecraft and the Pursuit of Peace (Ithaca, NY: Cornell 
University Press, 2003). 
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arms are unnecessary. Arms will probably offer marginal deterrent value but nevertheless 
empower the client so that it can sabotage the patron’s efforts to avoid regional conflict or pursue 
relations with the client’s adversary. Anticipating these dangers, the patron will likely withhold 
both an alliance and costly arms. An alliance is likely to be seen as undesirable because their 
interests have insufficient overlap and the client is militarily superior to its main adversary.34 The 
patron might still choose to arm its client occasionally if it believes that the client’s deterrent 
capabilities are likely to erode in the near future, but such transfers will be sporadic, relatively 
limited, and defensive in nature. 
If the patron believes that the client has revisionist intentions, then its entrapment fears 
will be greater. Security commitments should retain the form predicted in table 1, but these 
entrapment fears would increase the conditionality of alliances and limitations on arms across all 
cells. Greater alliance conditionality serves to lower moral hazard and to restrain the client by 
clarifying that the patron would not support the client’s aggressive behavior. They could appear 
in secret annexes either to render them invisible to potential domestic opposition groups or 
because the patron wishes to maintain the deterrent value of the alliance.  
                                                        
34 Some security ties between the patron and client could continue under these circumstances. For example, a client 
may desire to decrease its defense spending by relying increasingly on external support. A patron may also wish to 
lessen its own requirements for global military deployments by seeking to increase its client’s own defensive 
capabilities. Thus, although we predict that new alliances and major arms sales will be unlikely, they might still 
occur in highly conditional or limited forms that would minimize moral hazard. 
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Research Design and Alternative Explanations 
Using primary documents and newly declassified materials from the presidential libraries of 
Richard Nixon, Gerald Ford, and Jimmy Carter, we test our theoretical predictions. We focus on 
American commitments to two client states: Taiwan and Israel. 
 These historically important cases allow us to test the causal mechanisms of our theory. 
Each case features significant variation in one of our independent variables over time. In the 
Taiwan case, our first independent variable, commonality of security interests, changes in value. 
In the Israel, our second independent variable, the patron’s assessment of its client’s military 
capabilities, changes in value. The extensive documentary evidence in each case permits us to 
process trace how perceived shifts in threats and client capabilities causally affected the 
commitments the United States offered its clients. Moreover, because neither client had credible 
alternative sources of patronage, both were beholden to the United States, thus validating our 
exclusive focus on U.S. decisionmaking and our decision to hold client preferences constant. 
Finally, our theoretical framework highlights the role of threat perceptions and military 
capabilities, but we recognize that other factors could affect arms transfer and alliance decisions. 
We analyze cases that are relatively ‘easy’ for the domestic political and commercial motivations 
arguments because they involve countries with major political lobbies in the United State as well 
as large arms packages for which strong commercial interests would be at stake. By examining 
Democratic and Republican administrations, we control for potentially confounding variables.  
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U.S. Commitments to Taiwan 
Taiwan today occupies an ambiguous place in the U.S.-led security order in East Asia.35 
However, its security relationship with the United States was once much more clear-cut. In 1954, 
the United States formed an alliance with, and began sending costly arms to, Taiwan to contain 
communist expansion. No direct high-level ties existed between the United States and China 
until sweeping changes took place during Richard Nixon’s presidency, culminating in his famous 
1972 visit to Beijing. In 1979, the United States normalized relations with China and ended its 
alliance and formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan while maintaining its policy of arms transfers. 
Our theory predicts that before the normalization, the United States would have coupled an 
alliance commitment to Taiwan with a steady supply of costly arms (table 1, upper-left cell). 
During this period, the United States and Taiwan had common security interests, as both were 
highly concerned about the Chinese communist threat. U.S. threat perceptions changed 
dramatically in the early 1970s, however, as growing tensions in the Sino-Soviet relationship 
allowed Washington to use China for containing the Soviet threat. Accordingly, U.S. interests 
diverged from those of Taiwan, resulting in the United States’ rapprochement with China. 
Following normalization, costly arms transfers to Taiwan should have become the United States’ 
preferred means of signaling reassurance and practicing deterrence (table 1, bottom-left cell). 
                                                        
35 Consistent with U.S. government records, we refer to the People’s Republic of China as “China” and the Republic 
of China as “Taiwan.” 
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COMMON INTERESTS: U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS BEFORE NORMALIZATION WITH 
CHINA 
In the early 1950s, U.S. policymakers assessed that mainland China was a primary threat to the 
United States and that it was stronger militarily than the Republic of China in Taiwan. Driven 
from the mainland, Chiang Kai-shek’s Nationalist government became a bulwark against 
communism during the Korean War. President Harry Truman provided Taiwan with economic 
aid and deployed the U.S. Seventh Fleet to neutralize the Taiwan Strait, thereby preventing 
cross-strait attacks by either Taiwan or China. Truman’s successor, Dwight D. Eisenhower 
viewed Taiwan as central to its Asia policy. Eisenhower thought that Taiwan’s “existence, under 
American protection, was essential in maintaining the belief in Asia that the mainland juggernaut 
could be stopped and that the United States would stand by its anticommunist friends.”36 
Eisenhower therefore lifted Truman’s neutralization of the Taiwan Strait, allowing Chiang’s 
forces to fortify the islands of Quemoy and Matsu off the mainland’s coast. These developments 
prompted China to begin shelling Quemoy in August 1954.37  Communist Chinese media 
declared contemporaneously that  “China must liberate Taiwan.”38 
Alarmed by China’s belligerence, the United States signed a Mutual Defense Treaty with 
Taiwan on December 2, 1954. The treaty required the United States to defend Taiwan if the main 
island of Formosa or the outlying Pescadores Islands were attacked. In exchange, the treaty 
                                                        
36 Steven M. Goldstein, “Dialogue of the Deaf?” The Sino-American Ambassadorial-Level Talks, 1955-1970,” in 
Reexamining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973, eds. Robert S. Ross and Changbin Jiang (Cambridge, 
MA: Harvard University Press, 2002): 201. 
37 Gordon H. Chang and He Di “The Absence of War in the US-China Confrontation over Quemoy and Matsu in 
1954-1955: Contingency, Luck, Deterrence,” American Historical Review, Vol. 98, No. 5 (1981): 1508. 
38 See Hongshan Li and Zhaohui Hong, eds., Image, Perception, and the Making of US-China Relations (Lanham, 
Maryland: University Press of America, 1998): 351. 
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permitted the United States to base troops on Taiwan’s territory.39 Concerned about Taiwan 
entrapping the United States in a conflict, Washington insisted on a secret provision stipulating 
that the United States would assist Taiwan only for its defense.40 In 1954, the Eisenhower 
administration conditioned the transfer of F-84 fighter-bombers on Taiwan pledging restraint.41 
Moreover, the treaty did not explicitly oblige the United States to defend the offshore islands 
closer to the mainland, only suggesting that it would do so if the main islands of Formosa and 
Penghu were threatened. U.S. decisionmakers in private, however, made explicit commitments to 
Chiang to defend some of the offshore islands.42 In late January 1955, Eisenhower supported 
legislation (the Formosa Resolution) that granted him the authority to intervene militarily on 
Taiwan’s behalf should it be attacked.43 Early that year, U.S. decisionmakers even intimated that 
the United States would use nuclear weapons to defend Taiwan against China.44 
Although Washington and Taipei sometimes disagreed on strategy toward Beijing, even 
clashing over whether to use military force against the mainland, both viewed China as a 
significant threat. In 1956, during a visit to Taipei, President Eisenhower noted, “There is no way 
in which Asia can be free of communism until mainland China is free,” and suggested that “it 
was time to work out the strategy for liberating Asia.”45 John Foster Dulles commented, “The 
Chinese Communists seem to be much more violent and fanatical, more addicted to the use of 
                                                        
39 Mutual Defense Treaty between the United States and Taiwan, available at 
http://www.taiwandocuments.org/mutual01.htm. 
40 Thomas J. Christensen, Worse than a Monolith: Alliance Politics and Problems of Coercive Diplomacy in Asia 
(Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2011): 239. 
41 Christensen, Worse than a Monolith, 143. On U.S. fears of entrapment, see ibid., 142-143. 
42 Steven M. Goldstein, “The United States and the Republic of China, 1949-1978: Suspicious Allies,” (Stanford, 
CA: Institute for International Studies, 2000): 7–9. 
43 Gordon H. Chang, “To the Nuclear Brink: Eisenhower, Dulles, and the Quemoy-Matsu,” International Security, 
Vol. 12, No. 4 (1988): 104. 
44 Matthew Jones, After Hiroshima: The United States, Race and Nuclear Weapons in Asia, 1945-1965 (Cambridge, 
UK: Cambridge University Press, 2010): 251-252. 
45 FRUS 1955-1957 3: 329. 
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force than the Russians are or have become.”46 Beijing’s aggressive behavior required a response 
to reinforce Taiwan’s security, which, Robert Accinelli notes, “was critically dependent on U.S. 
aid and backing.”47 The United States augmented Taiwan’s defenses by providing defensive 
military assistance. In December 1956, U.S. policy toward Taiwan was crystallized in NSC 
(National Security Council Report) 5503, which stated that the United States should “not agree 
to [Taiwan’s] offensive actions against mainland Communist China.”48 Instead, the United States 
provided defensive arms and stationing nuclear-capable Matador missiles on Taiwan.49 
Notwithstanding the United States and Taiwan’s highly compatible security interests, 
Chiang’s rhetoric and actions suggested that he might embroil the United States in a war with 
China to facilitate the Nationalists’ return to the mainland.50 A 1957 U.S. National Intelligence 
Estimate (NIE) warned that although in the next year “Chinese Nationalists are very unlikely to 
launch an invasion … the Nationalists might attempt within the period of this estimate to embroil 
the U.S. in major hostilities against the Chinese Communists.”51 And so, despite his desire to 
appear resolute against communist China, Eisenhower had to consider the possibility of 
entrapment. Accordingly, Eisenhower sought assurances that Chiang would renounce the use of 
force to unseat mainland communist leaders.52 Rather than providing Taiwan with potentially 
offensive weapons when Chinese forces shelled the Quemoy and Matsu Islands during the 1958 
                                                        
46 Assistant Secretary for East Asia Walter Robertson also warned that the Soviet Union, “though great and 
dangerous, is not as active as the Chinese Communist menace to Asia.” Tucker, The China Threat, 176. 
47 Robert Accinelli, “A Thorn in the Side of Peace: The Eisenhower Administration and the 1958 Offshore Islands 
Crisis,” in Reexamining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973, eds. Robert S. Ross and Changbin Jiang 
(Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2002): 109. 
48 FRUS 1955-1957 2: 30-34. 
49 On what these weapons signaled, see Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, The China Threat: Memories, Myths, and Realities 
in the 1950s (New York, NY: Columbia University Press, 2012): 141. 
50 Nancy Bernkopf Tucker, United States-Taiwan Relations and the Crisis with China (Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press, 2009): 14-15. 
51 FRUS 1955-1957 3: 515-518. 
52 Jones, After Hiroshima, 380. 
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Taiwan Strait crisis, the United States deployed its own forces. Eisenhower ordered a massive 
force to Taiwan, including F-100 and F-86 aircraft, the latter of which was equipped with air-to-
air Sidewinder missiles so as to signal U.S. determination.53  
Clarifications were needed, however, regarding whether “[t]he intent of NSC 5503 was to 
oppose the development of [Taiwan’s] forces to conduct offensive operations against mainland 
Communist China.”54 To simplify this issue, Eisenhower directed, “We should provide Chiang 
Kai-shek with a limited capability in terms of amphibious equipment, but we should concentrate 
our assistance on the provision of defensive equipment.”55 In the following years, the United 
States would provide tactical fighter aircraft and smaller surface vessels, but no large-scale 
amphibious capabilities such as troop transports.56 U.S. officials were concerned that amphibious 
transports, combined with long-range bombers, could provide the mobility Taiwan required to 
invade the mainland. According to the U.S. embassy in Taiwan, the “request for B-57’s and 
landing craft” was “war material obviously of an offensive character. …Its aggressive nature is 
self-evident.”57 Later that year, Assistant Secretary of State for Far Eastern Affairs Averill 
Harriman asked the U.S. ambassador to Taiwan to “clearly state our unwillingness [to] provide 
these items.”58 Although scholars express concern about the distinguishability of offensive and 
defensive weapons, the primary documents indicate that policymakers dealing with military 
                                                        
53 Tucker, China Threat, 145. 
54 FRUS 1955-1957 3: 593-599. 
55 Ibid., 611-619. 
56 U.S. decisionmakers recognized that Taiwan could not launch military operations beyond minor but irritating 
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58 Ibid., 301-302. 
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assistance to Taiwan differentiated between those weapons that would provide Taiwan with an 
invasion capability and those that would not.59 
Throughout the 1960s, the U.S. intelligence community assessed that China was stronger 
militarily than Taiwan, but leaders in Washington remained concerned that Chiang might attempt 
an attack on the mainland.60 Divergence over preferred strategies and political goals gave rise to 
mutual distrust and suspicion. In 1962 and 1963, President John F. Kennedy restrained Chiang 
from launching attacks on China. 61  A 1964 National Policy Paper warned, Taiwan’s 
“dependence on the U.S. for its very existence will continue, in the final analysis, to provide the 
principal basis for U.S. influence. We face, however, the problem of adjusting to the declining 
importance of two of the specific instruments—our economic and military aid programs—
through which we have made our influence felt.”62 Indeed, from 1951 to 1966, the United States 
provided a large quantity of military assistance, amounting to more than $2.4 billion in value. 
Such sales helped bolster Taiwan’s defensive capabilities, assure Taiwan of continued U.S. 
support, and deter Chinese military action across the strait, while providing the United States 
with additional influence over the Nationalist government. 
Throughout the 1960s, “the United States and China both held extreme views of the 
other’s strategic, long-term objectives and potential threat to their respective security,” explains 
Robert Ross.63 By the end of the Kennedy administration, U.S. leaders were contemplating 
                                                        
59 Steven M. Goldstein, “The United States and the Republic of China, 1949-1978: Suspicious Allies,” 14. Also see 
FRUS 1969-1976 17: 144. 
60 See, for example, FRUS 1955-1957 3: 611-619. 
61 See FRUS 1961-63 22: 204-5 and 392-5. 
62 FRUS 1964-1968 31: 86-94. 
63 Robert S. Ross, “Introduction,” in Reexamining the Cold War: US-China Diplomacy, 1954-1973, eds. Robert S. 
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military strikes against Chinese nuclear facilities.64 Chinese leaders publicized their intention to 
eliminate Chiang’s government, likely through military action.65 In response, Secretary of State 
Dean Rusk reiterated that the U.S. commitment to Taiwan was “not open to negotiation.”66 This 
sense of Chinese threat was rooted not only in actual Chinese military and economic capabilities, 
but also in its “Maoist revolutionary propaganda and… popularity of the Maoist economic model 
in the Third World.”67 At the same time, however, new President Lyndon Johnson worried about 
reports that Chiang believed “now is the time for [Taiwan] to attack and overthrow the Chinese 
Communist regime on the Mainland.”68 In fact, Chiang’s vice president  had gone so far as to tell 
Johnson, “We have our aspirations” about regaining the mainland.69 Thus, U.S. leaders sought to 
provide Taiwan an alliance, but not offensive arms, through the late 1960s. 
DIVERGENT INTERESTS: U.S.-TAIWAN RELATIONS AFTER RAPPROCHEMENT  
The eruption of a Sino-Soviet border conflict worsened relations between Beijing and Moscow, 
convincing Nixon and Henry Kissinger that a conciliatory approach to China suited U.S. 
strategic interests.70 Moreover, growing incompatibility in the security interests of the United 
States and Taiwan led U.S. leaders to end the alliance and to rely only on arms transfers. 
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 In the early 1970s, the United States assessed that the local balance of power was 
continuing to favor China. The Chinese had begun their nuclear program in 1955, carried out a 
nuclear test in 1964, and were building a deterrent force by the late 1960s.71 Meanwhile, the 
Nixon Doctrine, which pushed U.S. allies to bear more of the conventional defense burden, 
meant that Taiwan would receive less support from the U.S. military. One report noted that 
“China could almost certainly take Taiwan in the absence of U.S. military intervention…[but] 
Peking would be constrained by the necessity of providing for defense needs elsewhere.”72 
Recognizing Taiwan’s insecurity, one internal U.S. memorandum cautioned that “a sudden drop 
in the U.S. military presence on Taiwan that exceeded reductions consonant with our 
withdrawals from Viet-Nam should probably not be taken.”73 In 1974, U.S. leaders commented, 
“[Taiwan] has thus shown increasing resignation to the inevitability of a growing [Chinese] 
military superiority.”74 Throughout this period, however, U.S. leaders continued to believe that 
China could not launch a successful invasion across the Taiwan Strait.  
U.S. leaders worried, however, that perceptions of U.S. irresoluteness would inspire 
Chinese aggression.75 Yet they also worried that Taipei might seek to spoil a U.S.-China 
agreement by initiating a conflict with the mainland. In a July 1971 discussion with Kissinger, 
Zhou Enlai warned that although “[i]t’s not possible for them to send troops en masse…there are 
those among his troops who deliberately want to make adventures—deliberately to create trouble 
for him, and for you.”76 To address these concerns, Taiwan assured the United States that it 
                                                        
71 “China,” Nuclear Threat Initiative, http://www.nti.org/country-profiles/china/. 
72 NIE, “China’s Military Policy and General Purpose Forces,” July 20, 1972, NIE 13-3-72, 4. Emphasis added. 
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75 Ibid. 
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would not seek revisionist goals through military means in the near term. The vice premier told 
Nixon in April 1970, “[Taiwan] will not use armed force against the mainland, even on a small 
scale.”77 In 1972, under pressure once again from Kissinger and other U.S. officials, Chiang 
gave “categorical assurances that [Taiwan] would refrain from any actions of an offensive or 
provocative nature” around Nixon’s visit to China.78 Washington was adamant about these 
assurances, with the U.S. ambassador to Taiwan warning that actions by Taiwan or its 
sympathizers on the mainland “would put [Taiwan] in position to be plausibly blamed for 
untoward incident.”79 
Courting China while calibrating U.S. policy toward a militarily disadvantaged Taiwan 
proved a delicate balance. China’s eight demands for improving relations with the United States 
included the statement that “[a]ll U.S. armed forces and military installations should be 
withdrawn from Taiwan and the Taiwan Strait area. …[The United States] must recognize 
[China] as the sole legal government representing China.”80 To reassure and to deter China 
simultaneously, Kissinger took several “symbolic steps.” He explained to his Chinese 
interlocutors, “We have ended the Taiwan Strait Patrol, removed a squadron of air tankers from 
Taiwan, and reduced the size of our military advisory group by 20 percent. …We are prepared to 
begin reducing our other forces on Taiwan as our relations improve, so that the military 
questions need not be a principal obstacle between us.”81 Kissinger did not inform Zhou that the 
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United States would increase the amount of military assistance it provided Taiwan despite its 
troop withdrawals. Therefore, the United States could appear to be decreasing its military 
support while increasing Taiwan’s defensive capabilities. 
 The United States continued to provide costly military systems to Taiwan during the 
1970s. It did not transfer troop transports that would help Taiwan launch offensive amphibious 
operations against China, but U.S. leaders allowed Taiwan to purchase Hawk surface-to-air 
missiles and permitted the co-production of F-5E fighter aircraft. These systems were not as 
technologically advanced as Taiwan desired, but they conveyed a sustained U.S. commitment, 
even after rapprochement with China in 1972 (see table 2). 
Table 2. Planned U.S. Military Assistance to Taiwan, 1972-1976 
Fiscal Years ($ million) 
1972 1973 1974 1975 1976 
Foreign Military Sales credit   45 44 65 135 124 
Military Assistance/Aid Program  11 10 5.8 5.8 .5 
Enhance Plus grant (Vietnam-related) – 18 28 – – 
Total      56 72 99 141 125 
 
SOURCE: “Memorandum From Richard T. Kennedy of the National Security Council Staff to the 
President’s Assistant for National Security Affairs (Kissinger)," April 7, 1973, in Foreign Relations of 
the United States, 1969-1976 18: 240. 
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Costly U.S. arms sales to Taiwan persisted even after the U.S. alliance commitment dissolved. 
Because Washington worried that “Peking would be bothered by an indefinite and formal U.S. 
military involvement with Taiwan,” it sought to avoid “weapons which were clearly offensive in 
nature (e.g., strategic bombers, long-range missiles, or modern amphibious 
equipment)…sophisticated weapons (e.g., advanced aircraft or major missile production 
capabilities); the most advanced weapons in the U.S. inventory (e.g., F-15 aircraft, TV guided 
bombs, advanced ECM [electronic counter-measure] systems)…[or] rapid introduction of large 
quantities of weapons into Taipei’s inventory.”82 U.S. officials still believed that they could 
differentiate between offensive and defensive weapons, and avoid transferring them. The United 
States wanted Taiwan to have “an Air Force designed primarily for air-to-air capability against 
fighters, bombers and airlift forces, and for countering a PRC naval attack; a navy capable of 
withstanding attacks by PRC submarine forces and missile-equipped surface craft and of 
countering PRC amphibious forces in coordination with the [Taiwan’s] Air Force; a relatively 
small but mobile and well-equipped [Taiwan’s] Army, including surface-to-air missiles for air 
defense, backed by a trained reserve force.”83 In suggesting how the United States could help 
develop Taiwan’s forces, a 1974 U.S. government memo listed several criteria: “1) the impact on 
our objective of reducing the military component of Taiwan’s security; 2) the effect on U.S.-PRC 
normalization; 3) the effect on Taiwan’s confidence and stability; 4) the deterrent effect against a 
PRC use of force to resolve the Taiwan issue; 5) the effect on chances of [Sino-Taiwan] political 
accommodation; 6) [Taiwan’s] economic and technological capabilities.”84 
                                                        
82 FRUS 1973-1976 18: 548-549. 
83 Ibid., 552. 
84 Ibid., 554. 
   30 
 Public statements by U.S. officials now featured what Kissinger called “constructive 
ambiguity.” The “One China” policy and the Republic of China’s removal from the United 
Nations in 1971 were heavy political blows for Taiwan. These developments prompted concern 
that “[d]esperation engendered by the feeling that we were completely abandoning Taiwan in 
proceeding with normalization might provoke [Taiwan’s] declaration of independence.”85 U.S. 
officials privately tried to reassure Taiwan’s leaders of continued U.S. support, but it became 
clear by the late 1970s that the United States would normalize relations with China and end 
formal diplomatic ties with Taiwan. Responsibility for normalization fell to the Carter 
administration.86 It wanted to provide enough arms for Taiwan to deter China and ensure 
peaceful cross-strait relations.87 A 1976 NIE found that neither side could launch an offensive 
operation across the strait without incurring unacceptable costs. This situation of mutual 
deterrence was to hold until at least the early 1980s.88 Nevertheless, Washington had to walk a 
fine line in balancing its regional interests.89 A 1978 joint State and Defense Department 
memorandum on arms sales to Taiwan advised: “Taiwan’s self-defense capability will continue 
to be linked to its ability to buy arms from the U.S. …There are some indications that Peking 
views our existing relationship to Taiwan as a deterrent to Taipei’s looking elsewhere for support, 
or seeking unilaterally to alter the island’s status. …We do not wish to so arm [Taiwan] that we 
do damage to our relations with [China] or that we encourage [Taiwan] to behave without 
                                                        
85 FRUS 1977-1980 13: 115-116. 
86 On normalization, see William C. Kirby, Robert S. Ross, and Gong Li, Normalization of US-China Relations: An 
International History (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 2007).  
87 FRUS 1977-1980 13: 116-118. 
88 NIE 13-76, November 11, 1976, 65-68. A later RAND report corroborates this view. See David A. Shlapak, 
David T. Orletsky, Toy I. Reid, Murray Scot Tanner, and Barry Wilson, “A Question of Balance: Political Context 
and Military Aspects of the China-Taiwan Dispute,” (Santa Monica, CA: RAND, 2009): 22-23. 
89 To prevent Taiwan from undercutting U.S. policies, Brzezinski’s advisor wrote in September 1977: “we should 
link weapons sales to progress on normalization… to indicate to Taipei that they will bear some costs in the event 
momentum on normalization is lost.” FRUS 1977-1980 13: 231-238. 
   31 
restraint toward [China]. In short, our arms sales must be carefully calibrated to maintain an 
adequate balance in the Strait.”90 Although China still faced significant challenges in mounting 
cross-strait operations, the local balance of power was shifting further in its favor. Secretary of 
State Cyrus Vance noted in 1977, “For a number of years, Peking will not be capable of taking 
the island by force except at a cost it would probably consider unacceptable both in military 
terms and in terms of China’s international relations.”91 Nevertheless, “PRC military strength 
will increase over time,” requiring a new approach to prevent cross-strait conflict.92 Accordingly, 
U.S. decisionmakers believed that arms transfers to Taiwan could substitute for the alliance.93 
Carter himself noted, “For a long time—with arms purchases—Taiwan will be able to withstand 
any attack.”94 The Carter administration mistakenly believed, however, that China would not 
protest the United States’ continued transfer of weapons to Taiwan. It had to disabuse Chinese 
leaders of the belief that normalization would cease all U.S. arms transfers to Taiwan.95 
On December 15, 1978, Washington instructed the U.S. ambassador to Taiwan to tell 
Chiang that the United States and China “have agreed to establish diplomatic relations. …the 
United States will recognize the People’s Republic of China as the government of China.”96 The 
same cable instructed the ambassador to reassure Chiang that in a year he would “be able to 
resume purchase of carefully selected defensive weapons.”97 Yet U.S. decisionmakers hesitated 
when they received Taiwan’s request for fighter jets. They wanted to reassure China of bona fide 
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U.S. intentions for rapprochement.98 By this time U.S. officials had assessed that “China is now 
actively engaged in attempting to build a durable, world-wide anti-Soviet consensus.” 99 
Ultimately, the United States agreed to offer Taiwan the “limited range” F-5, but decided against 
more capable F-4s and F-16s.100 This decision aligned with the NSC staff’s suggestion to 
reinforce “our willingness to put Taiwan in a better position to defend itself while protecting the 
Administration against charges that it is abandoning Taipei. …We should, therefore, indicate at 
an early date our willingness to sell a Hawk missile battalion, a substantial number of additional 
F-5E aircraft, and, perhaps, the Harpoon missile system to [Taiwan]. This would provide 
reassurance to Taipei, ease the concerns of Taiwan’s friends in the U.S., and send the right signal 
to Peking.” 101  U.S. leaders believed such steps were reasonable because the arms were 
“defensive in character and could be applied to meet Taiwan’s legitimate security needs without 
unduly damaging our relations with [China].”102 
Whatever its intent, the Carter administration failed to anticipate the Congress’s negative 
reaction regarding the lack of consultation on the termination of formal diplomatic relations with 
Taiwan in 1979 and the end of the Mutual Defense Treaty in 1980. Members were also outraged 
because they perceived Carter’s actions as abandoning an ally and damaging the United States’ 
reputation. Indeed, shortly after China received diplomatic recognition from Washington, it 
invaded North Vietnam–an action that amplified the concerns expressed in Congress.103 The 
Taiwan Relations Act (TRA), which came into force on April 10, 1979, committed the United 
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States to provide Taiwan with “arms of a defensive character…in such quantity as may be 
necessary to enable Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability…based solely upon 
their judgment of the needs of Taiwan.”104 The TRA also required that Washington maintain the 
capacity to “resist any resort to force or other forms of coercion that would jeopardize the 
security, or the social or economic system, of the people of Taiwan.”105 Nevertheless, the TRA 
differed from an alliance because it did not commit the United States to defend Taiwan. Rather, 
“The President and the Congress shall determine, in accordance with constitutional processes, 
appropriate action by the United States in response to any such danger.” 106  This weak 
commitment and the lack of official ties were compounded by how the TRA did not dictate 
which weapons would be sold to Taiwan, how often, or in what quantity. Its purpose instead was 
to reassure Taiwan of U.S. diplomatic support despite the termination of a formal defense pact. 
Yet its inherent ambiguities were intended to address three goals: to convey support for Taiwan, 
to support local deterrence and defense, and to continue normalization with China.107 
U.S. leaders still faced a dilemma after the TRA came into force. China cautioned in the 
spring of 1979 that “[i]f things which will bring severe harm to this political basis are allowed to 
happen again and again, it will bring harm to our bilateral relations.”108 In a memorandum to 
President Carter, Secretary of State Vance noted: “We have a dual problem in determining our 
position on the resumption of arms sales to Taiwan. On the one hand, our action should be taken 
in such a way as to reassure Congress and Taiwan that we continue to have an interest in 
Taiwan’s legitimate defense requirements. On the other hand, we wish to avoid provoking the 
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PRC to react in a manner harmful to our developing bilateral relationship.”109 Nevertheless, 
Vance warned: “Taiwan views our arms sales commitment as the keystone of their security 
policy and will be anxious for reconfirmation of our pledges early in the new year.”110 Indeed, 
on November 8, 1979, Taiwan placed a request for “high-performance fighter aircraft…with 
most other requests focused on air and sea defense weapons.”111 U.S. officials now reconsidered 
selling F-4s to Taiwan, noting that “F-4 sale would dramatize that the U.S. is not ‘abandoning’ 
Taiwan…both with Congress and on Taiwan, an F-4 sale is probably the most popular step we 
can take.”112 Responding to Taiwan’s demands, however, Vance reasoned in December 1979 
that an upgrade in the U.S. military commitment to Taiwan was unlikely. To him, there was “no 
reason at this point to change our position of denying sales to Taiwan of F-4, F-16 or F-18 
aircraft, all of which have offensive capability as well as violate the arms transfer policy.”113 
Ronald Reagan’s administration also struggled to balance arms sales to Taiwan against 
normalization concessions to China. During his presidential campaign, Reagan expressed 
concern about Chinese intentions and the effects of normalization on Taiwan. Reagan’s election 
elicited hope in Taipei that Washington would upgrade its military commitment by supplying 
Taiwan with newer fighter aircraft. Threatened by Reagan’s stance toward normalization, China 
demanded in 1981 that the United States commit not only to denying Taiwan advanced fighters, 
but also to ending all arms sales. Ultimately, the Reagan administration rejected the sale, 
explaining that continuing provision of the aging, short-range F-5Es was adequate for Taiwan’s 
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defense needs.114 Beijing was adamant that U.S. arms sales to Taiwan should cease, arguing that 
even a supply of defensive military capabilities could have negative effects on U.S.-China 
relations. Yet China eventually yielded to a “phase-down” instead of a “phase-out” of U.S. arms 
sales to Taiwan, without an explicit U.S. commitment to end them. The Third Joint Communiqué 
of August 18, 1982, embodied this compromise. The communiqué acknowledged that “the 
United States Government states that it does not seek to carry out a long-term policy of arms 
sales to Taiwan, that its arms sales to Taiwan will not exceed, either in qualitative or in 
quantitative terms, the level of those supplied in recent years since the establishment of 
diplomatic relations between the United States and China, and that it intends gradually to reduce 
its sale of arms to Taiwan, leading, over a period of time, to a final resolution.”115 
Despite U.S. concessions to China, Reagan took several actions to demonstrate his 
intention to support Taiwan’s security. Many documents from the Reagan years remain classified, 
but available primary documents and secondary sources indicate that Reagan wished to redirect 
U.S. policy toward Taiwan. First, he authorized Taiwan to release his “six assurances,” which 
included commitments that the United States would not alter the terms of the TRA, that the 
administration would not consult the Chinese government in advance on arms sales to Taiwan, 
and that the United States would not pressure Taiwan to negotiate with China. Former U.S. 
Ambassador to China James Lilley suggests these efforts “were designed to be a sign to Taiwan 
that it was not going to be abandoned by the Reagan administration. …The assurances cushioned 
the anxiety and uneasiness of the Taiwan leadership.”116 Reagan also provided an even more 
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forceful private assurance to Taiwan’s leadership that the United States was committed “to the 
security and well-being of its people” by promising to provide it with “sufficient arms to enable 
Taiwan to maintain a sufficient self-defense capability.”117  An additional step apparently 
intended to ensure the long-term viability of U.S. Taiwan policy was Reagan’s issuance of a 
classified presidential directive that incorporated his interpretation of the communiqués. The 
directive noted that “the U.S. willingness to reduce its arms sales to Taiwan is conditioned 
absolutely upon the continued commitment of China to the peaceful solution of the Taiwan-PRC 
differences. …It is essential that the quantity and quality of the arms provided Taiwan be 
conditioned entirely on the threat posed by the PRC.”118  
None of these commitments were as binding as the Mutual Defense Treaty had been. 
They left significant room for interpretation of Taiwan’s future defense needs. Reagan merely 
promised that Washington would “continue to monitor carefully Beijing’s military production 
and deployment, and to analyze all indicators of Beijing’s intentions toward Taiwan. If any of 
those factors change, that will of course affect our judgment of Taiwan’s defense needs.”119 Still, 
the combination of U.S. public and private pledges of reassurance, together with extension of the 
F-5E co-production line and a substantial arms sales package, tempered Taiwan’s reaction to the 
1982 Joint Communiqué without rupturing U.S. relations with China. Reagan’s policies 
effectively sought to substitute the hand-tying commitment the United States had with Taiwan 
                                                                                                                                                                                  
(New York, NY: Public Affairs, 2004): 247. 
117 Ibid., 139. 
118 James Lilley and Jeffrey Lilley, China Hands, 248. 
119 Ibid. Reagan also wrote a secret memo stating that any willingness to reduce arms transfers to Taiwan (as 
implied by the 1982 communiqué) should be conditioned on China’s commitment to the peaceful resolution 
of those countries’ differences. Tucker, Strait Talk, 152. 
   37 
pre-normalization with one that gave the United States more flexibility. This policy reassured 
Taiwan while the United States courted China. 
SUMMARY AND ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS 
The Taiwan case confirms our theory. When U.S. leaders assessed that communist China posed a 
significant security threat to U.S. interests, they entered into a formal defense pact with Taiwan 
and supplied it with costly arms to preserve its deterrent capabilities. But when the Sino-Soviet 
split made normalization with China possible, U.S. leaders’ perception of the threat from China 
changed. Friendlier relations with the Chinese government decreased the U.S. perception of the 
military threat from China to U.S. forces in East Asia. Moreover, China’s ability to threaten U.S. 
forces decreased as the withdrawal from Vietnam made Taiwan less vital as a forward staging 
area for U.S. forces deploying to Southeast Asia. The commonality of security interests between 
the United States and Taiwan subsequently decreased. 
Table 3: Summary of predictions and evidence for Taiwan 
 values of independent 
variables 
predicted value of 
dependent variable 
observed value of 
dependent variable 
1954-72 U.S. assessment: highly 
compatible security interests; 
unfavorable Taiwanese 
capabilities vis-à-vis China 
provision of both costly 
arms and defense pact 
provision of both costly 
arms and defense pact 
1972-82 U.S. assessment: somewhat 
compatible security interests; 
unfavorable Taiwanese 
capabilities vis-à-vis China 
provision of costly arms 
without unconditional 
defense pact 
provision of costly arms 
without unconditional 
defense pact (from 1979 
onward) 
 
As our theory predicts, the United States engaged China and rescinded its alliance with Taiwan 
despite the worsening military balance between China and Taiwan. However, the United States 
still continued to provide Taiwan with substantial military assistance to maintain the status quo 
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across the strait. Consistent with our theory, the United States used a sunk cost signal by 
providing a large, steady, and (with the TRA) institutionalized flow of weapons to Taiwan. The 
provision of arms remained limited to defensive weapons, especially when U.S. leaders worried 
that Taiwan’s military was planning or preparing for an offensive against the mainland. 
This case should be ‘easy’ for competing theories, but our research finds little evidence 
that U.S. decisionmakers were motivated primarily by other factors, such as domestic politics, 
commercial interests, or efforts to gain leverage over Taiwan. Regarding domestic politics, the 
documents reveal that U.S. decisionmakers were keenly aware of the domestic constraints on 
Taiwan policy. As a White House memo noted in 1978, “There is no domestic constituency 
actively pushing for or even interested in normalization, but there is such a constituency 
vigorously opposing it. Thus, there is no political plus in normalization; there is only minus.”120 
Despite this domestic political opposition, the United States still abrogated the defense pact with 
Taiwan. We do not suggest that U.S. domestic politics played no role in Washington’s relations 
with Taiwan. Indeed, domestic politics prompted the creation of the TRA: had it not been for 
Congress, U.S. defensive weapons sales might not have been institutionalized. Nevertheless, as 
Carter’s national security advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski observed at the time, “Until the mid-
1960s, the Taiwan Lobby was thought to have great political clout. Then, in the late sixties and 
even more after Nixon’s 1972 visit, the Lobby fell into disarray.”121 The Taiwan lobby’s 
inability to maintain the alliance is evidence that it was a secondary concern for policymakers. 
As Brzezinski noted in 1977, “The Taiwan Lobby does not constitute a major obstacle to 
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normalization.”122 In short, the strategic interest in normalization with China was greater than 
the domestic political power of the Taiwan lobby. Similarly, government reports regarding the 
advantages and disadvantages of providing arms to Taiwan seldom mention either commercial 
interests or influence-seeking. Both motivations could have been considerations for 
policymakers, but the lack of discussion about them in interagency meetings forces us to 
question their importance. U.S. leaders understood that Taiwan had few other sources of support, 
so it was unlikely to abandon the United States. Moreover, leverage-seeking does not explain 
why the United States chose to end its official relationship with Taiwan in the 1970s. Therefore, 
although domestic politics, commercial interests, and leverage-seeking may have driven some 
U.S. decisions on Taiwan, the evidence suggests that strategic considerations primarily 
motivated U.S. policymakers. 
U.S. COMMITMENTS TO ISRAEL 
Few doubt today the close U.S.-Israel alignment. Yet, during the first half of the Cold War, this 
relationship was uncertain and contingent. Though the United States had limited diplomatic 
relations with Israel in the 1950s, the Eisenhower administration eventually regarded Israel as a 
“potential strategic asset.” Nevertheless, both it and the Kennedy administration provided only 
minimal defensive arms and extended no alliance commitment (the bottom-right cell in table 
1).123 Late in the Johnson administration and through the Nixon administration, the United States 
transitioned toward using costly arms transfers to improve and to maintain Israel’s deterrence 
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capabilities in the absence of an alliance (the bottom-left cell). U.S. leaders’ commitment 
decisions hinged on assessments of the local military balance.  
FAVORABLE BALANCE: U.S.-ISRAEL SECURITY RELATIONS BEFORE 1968 
On May 12, 1963, Israeli Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion wrote to President Kennedy asking a 
public bilateral security pact or “all the equivalent kinds of armament with which the armed 
forces of Egypt and the other Arab states are equipped” in return for Israel forgoing a nuclear 
weapons capability.124 The letter came four days after Kennedy remarked at a press conference 
that the United States “support[s] the security of both Israel and her neighbors.”125 Ben-Gurion’s 
letter prompted debate within the Kennedy administration over whether to extend an alliance to 
Israel. In considering this request, Kennedy though that an explicit security guarantee could 
make Arab states more conciliatory and reduce uncertainty over U.S. intentions in the region.126 
The evidence shows that the two factors highlighted in our theory drove the U.S. decision 
ultimately to reject Israel’s request for a hand-tying commitment. First, Washington assessed that 
Israel was capable of deterring its adversaries. Kennedy’s final reply noted that the United States 
had carried out an assessment of its own ability to “deter or halt swiftly any aggression against 
Israel” and found that “existing informal arrangements” were sufficient.127 The Joint Chiefs of 
Staff agreed that “there is little or no advantage to the U.S. in going beyond the type of public 
assurances contained in the President’s May 8th statement.”128 
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A second, more fundamental, factor that limited U.S. commitments to Israel was the 
incompatibility of their security interests. Both Israel and the United States did not want Arab 
states to strengthen their ties with the Soviet Union.129 Nevertheless, the United States saw Arab 
nationalism as a potential bulwark against communism, whereas Israel saw it as a threat to its 
own security.130 The administration was thus reluctant to make a formal and public commitment 
to Israel for fear of damaging diplomatic relations with its Arab neighbors. As Kennedy wrote, 
“Our policies and programs in regard to the Arab states have resulted in improved relationships 
which permit us to talk frankly and realistically to them and enable us to exert some leverage on 
their actions.”131 The Kennedy administration was optimistic about working with Egyptian 
President Gamal Abdel Nasser on regional arms control and other issues. It saw a need to 
prevent the Middle East from being divided into the two superpower camps. Indeed, losing 
Egypt to the Soviet Union would diminish U.S. influence in the Arab word.132  
Kennedy therefore rejected a defense pact with Israel, but did offer the Israelis a one-time, 
non-costly transfer of defensive Hawks missiles. Justifying the sale was a Defense Department 
memorandum that identified Israel as “vulnerable to [Egyptian] air attack…increasingly so with 
the arrival of additional Soviet TU-16’s.”133 For Kennedy, the arms transfers were intended to 
maintain the local balance of power and deter Arab attacks. In a memorandum articulating his 
thinking, the president asked, “Could we get away with arms aid or joint planning in lieu of a 
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guarantee? If we argue Israel doesn’t really need any tighter assurances than it has already there 
may be other ways to prove we mean to protect her. Hawk set a precedent.”134 This provision of 
arms aside, the administration made clear that the United States did not want to become a “major 
supplier of offensive or sophisticated weapons to parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict. It is [a] 
single decision designed [to] meet [a] specific need for an improved air defense.”135 The 
reasoning used by the Kennedy administration thus accords with our theoretical predictions, 
placing U.S.-Israeli security cooperation circa 1963 in the bottom-right cell of table 1. 
The Johnson administration similarly saw Israeli and U.S. security interests as not 
compatible enough to justify a commitment that could undermine broader U.S. interests in the 
region. Johnson began wrestling with the patron’s dilemma when in November 1963, Israel 
requested surface-to-surface missiles, tanks, and some naval vessels. These weapons would have 
granted Israel the capacity to strike Egyptian artillery locations and launch penetration raids into 
Egyptian territory. U.S. officials were skeptical as to whether Israel needed these weapons. One 
NIE early that year had concluded that “Israel will probably retain its overall military superiority 
vis-à-vis the Arab states for the next several years. As long as the present balance of forces 
remains substantially unchanged, we believe that neither side is likely to initiate major 
hostilities.”136 McGeorge Bundy, special assistant to Johnson, argued that Israel’s request was 
financially “wasteful” and “unnecessary” from a strategic perspective.137 The Joint Chiefs of 
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Staff concurred, claiming that a “significant increase in Israeli Army units does not appear to be 
justified by the existing strength [sic] relationship between the Israeli and Arab Armies.”138 
Meeting this request would also antagonize Arab governments, especially because U.S. officials 
worried that the “good relations [the United States] has built up with the Arabs are increasingly 
in jeopardy” due to their tensions with Israel.139In January 1964, the Departments of State and 
Defense affirmed the need to consider both Israeli and Arab interests since “the key to a 
constructive Near Eastern policy is maintaining a balance in our relationships with the Arabs and 
Israel.”140 The U.S. Joint Chiefs of Staff noted that U.S. arms policy could proceed “without 
positively identifying the United States with either of the sides in the Arab-Israeli conflict.”141  
Johnson nevertheless sought to reassure Israel by maintaining non-costly arms transfers. 
Indeed, the United States recognized Israel’s need for new tanks to preserve the local balance of 
power. A memorandum circulated by the Joint Chiefs of Staff stated that “there is a military need 
for Israel to modernize its tank force because the bulk of its tank inventory is obsolescent.”142 
However, other U.S. government officials asserted that the “U.S. wishes to avoid significant area 
arms imbalance [sic] in either direction; if Israel attained clear military superiority a dangerous 
escalation would surely ensue.”143 Moreover, the United States had to consider the likely 
reaction of the Arab world, as “tanks from [the] U.S. would strengthen U.S. commitment to 
Israel in Arab eyes.”144 In a meeting with the Israeli Prime Minister Levi Eshkol, Deputy Special 
Counsel Myer Feldman explained that “an important factor in these considerations was how the 
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U.S. could best maintain and expand its influence in the Arab world.”145 Still, Washington did 
not want to leave Israel empty-handed. It sympathized with Israel’s need for tanks. The U.S. 
government thus actively encouraged third-parties such as West Germany to supply tanks 
instead.146  Arms transfers done in this indirect manner enhanced Israeli security without 
compromising U.S. relations with the Arab states.147 
On June 5, 1967, war broke out between Israel and Egypt, Jordan, and Syria. Israel 
conquered the Sinai Peninsula and the Gaza Strip from Egypt, the West Bank from Jordan, and 
the Golan Heights from Syria, thereby reinforcing U.S. views that Israel faced a friendly military 
balance. Acting Secretary of State Nicholas Katzenbach informed Johnson that “the military 
balance is in Israel’s favor and should remain so for at least a year.”148 U.S. military observers 
agreed, pointing to Israel’s air superiority and its success in destroying Arab “morale, motivation, 
and confidence”–intangibles that “cannot be recovered quickly.” 149  Supporting this 
characterization is a secret NSC memo produced during Jimmy Carter’s presidency that details 
the evolution in U.S. arms sales to Israel: “Up to the Six-Day War in 1967, the U.S. objective 
was to sell limited quantities of selected defensive weapons to Israel, such as the Hawk 
antiaircraft missile system.”150 That said, in the wake of this war, U.S. decisionmakers still saw 
Israel and U.S. security interests as only somewhat compatible. As our theory predicts, given the 
limited convergence of U.S.-Israeli security interests, and Israel’s ability to continue deterring its 
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regional adversaries, U.S. leaders were reluctant to become Israel’s major arms supplier, 
eschewing commitments to supply costly arms in the future, thereby placing the overall relations 
in the bottom-right cell of table 1.  
SHAKY BALANCE: U.S.-ISRAELI SECURITY RELATIONS 1968-73 
The defeat of Arab states in the Six Day War prompted the Soviet Union to become significantly 
more involved on their behalf. As a January 1968 NIE concluded, “Since the June War in 1967, 
the Soviet military presence has grown in the area: roughly 5,000 Soviet military advisers are 
now stationed in several area countries; the Soviet naval squadron in the Mediterranean has been 
strengthened, and is supported by air and port facilities in Egypt.”151 Johnson “express[ed] his 
deep concern over the odds working against Israel. He knew the Israeli people were superior in 
ability to their neighbors, but he feared they might not be superior to the Soviets. The President 
recalled how the Soviets had poured arms into the Arab countries after the war. He said he was 
not sure what Soviet intentions were.”152 Rusk observed several months later that “the influence 
of the Soviet Union in such key countries as Egypt, Syria, and Iraq continues to grow at the 
expense of our and other Western interests.”153 Yet Rostow explained that “the ‘overriding 
consideration’ must be our avoiding a polarization of the Middle East in which a small Israel, 
backed by a U.S. with an ambiguous commitment, faces the Arabs, led by extremists and backed 
by a determined USSR.”154 
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Against this backdrop, in early 1968 Israel requested new aircraft from the United States, 
including F-4 Phantoms.155 The F-4 was among the most advanced in service and its firepower, 
speed, and adaptability would augment Israel’s offensive capabilities. The Skyhawk, another 
aircraft that Israeli desired but found less appealing, was lighter, slower, and cheaper. Worried 
about the Arab reaction, the Johnson administration was reluctant to authorize the F-4 request. 
Rostow opined that “More than just seeking a specific number of aircraft, Eshkol may be looking 
for a firmer commitment to Israel’s security. He must understand that security guarantees and 
treaties are out, but he may seek a guaranteed source of arms.”156 Still, he noted, “It’s hard to 
know how much the Israelis are pushing the Soviet threat merely to justify their case for more 
arms.”157 Indeed, the Joint Chiefs of Staff assessed that the “Israeli Air Force can cope for the 
next 18 months with any potential threat they face.” Secretary of Defense Robert McNamara 
noted that “Israel can prevail over any potential Arab enemy” and expressed concern that acting 
on the plane request could invite “further Russian support” for the Arab states.158 Rusk asserted 
the need for Israel to court international opinion, particularly in the United Nations. 159 
Accordingly, Johnson pledged only “to keep Israel’s military defense capability under active and 
sympathetic examination and review in the light of all relevant factors.”160 He thus delayed 
making a decision on the Phantoms. 
The Johnson administration did not see an immediate Israeli need for the Phantoms, but it 
did envision that such a need could develop in the future given reports of increased Soviet 
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involvement in the region.161 Despite mounting domestic political pressure in 1968 for the 
Johnson administration to approve Israel’s aircraft requests, the president was unyielding. He 
argued with congressional leaders, “We don’t want to be in a position of just being arms 
merchants and starting an arms race with the Russians there.”162 Soviet aircraft deliveries to 
Egypt and congressional pressure to maintain a U.S. commitment to Israel’s security, however, 
led Johnson to reassess his earlier decision.163 Indeed, we should not overstate the importance of 
domestic politics. As David Pollock writes, “domestic political considerations had a greater 
effect on the timing than on the substance of [the Phantom decision].”164 Nevertheless, Johnson 
used the opportunity to extract Israeli promises to exercise “nuclear restraint.” 165  Israel 
reaffirmed “that it will not be the first power in the Middle East to introduce nuclear weapons 
and agrees not to use any aircraft supplied by the United States as a nuclear weapons carrier.”166 
This quid pro quo notwithstanding, this sale of offensive airplanes made the United States the 
main supplier of arms to Israel, reflecting a shift in U.S. leaders’ assessments of Israel’s ability to 
deter its enemies. 
When Nixon became president in 1969, Egypt had already begun its so-called War of 
Attrition against Israel. Preoccupied with other major foreign policy issues, Nixon delegated the 
Arab-Israeli conflict to the State Department, which claimed that the United States should adopt 
an impartial policy toward the Middle East to curb growing Soviet influence. The rationale for 
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refusing a defense pact remained, as one NSC paper averred that “We should avoid any open-
ended and uncontrollable commitment [a security guarantee] because it would subordinate the 
United States to Israeli concepts of defense and security, and because it would polarize the 
area between us and the USSR …Apart from a specific guarantee …we could give Israel a firm 
commitment to provide it the military equipment we believe needed to maintain a reasonable 
balance in the area.”167  
And indeed in 1969 Israel requested an additional 100 A-4 Skyhawks and 25 F-4 
Phantoms, creating a dilemma for U.S. decision-makers once again.168 After all, “the sale of 
sophisticated equipment [carried] the implied obligation to continue supply.” 169  U.S. 
decisionmakers feared that a negative response would “not only risk a vehement political and 
propaganda reaction but could foster a go-it-alone psychology in Israel, encourage an even 
harder line toward the Arabs and diminish further our already limited influence there.” 
Nevertheless, “Any decision which added to Israel’s already demonstrably superior military 
strength would produce seriously adverse reactions in the Arab world.” A positive decision 
would also provoke greater Soviet military involvement in the Middle East, but a negative 
decision could imply a “success for Soviet diplomacy.”170  
 Mindful of these considerations, the Nixon administration postponed its decision on the 
Phantoms, concluding that “detailed analysis has identified no military need for the additional 
aircraft Israel has requested for the time being. If as a result of actions by others, in particular the 
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Soviet Union or France, or as a result of unusual losses, Israel’s clear cut air superiority is 
threatened, we would be in a position to move quickly to maintain Israel’s margin of safety.”171 
This line of reasoning appeared in many memoranda and documents circulating among U.S. 
decisionmakers from December 1969 to March 1970. These reports reiterated the view that the 
local military balance of power continued to favor Israel, notwithstanding the Israeli 
government’s insistence to the contrary.172 Indeed, calculations of the balance of power were 
directly linked to assessments about arms transfers. For example, one report concluded, “Given 
the analysis of the present military balance above, it seems fair to conclude that the U.S. 
obligation to contribute to Israel’s chances of survival could be fulfilled without any 
commitment right now to increase further Israel’s aircraft inventory.” The authors of these 
reports also recognized the need to restrain Israel and warned that further arms sales would only 
embolden it and create risks for the United States to be dragged into the Arab-Israeli conflict. 
The “unqualified judgment” of all members of the NSC Working Group on the Middle East was 
that a decision to accept in full Israel’s arms requests would “‘blow the place apart.’”173  
During this time, U.S. decisionmakers began to see that a strong Israel could help manage 
the Soviet Union, now becoming a shared adversary of both Israel and the United States. As 
Nixon bluntly asked, “Why should it not be our policy to let Israel scare them a little bit 
more?”174 Indeed, although the United States did not see Arab countries as adversaries the way 
Israel did, growing Soviet involvement in the Arab-Israeli conflict began to exert greater 
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influence on U.S. diplomacy towards Israel.175 At one meeting, Nixon reasoned, “Assume for the 
sake of discussion that there is no domestic political pressure and that there is no moral question 
of continuing support involved, would the U.S. foreign policy interests be served by dumping 
Israel?…Looking at this from the Soviet viewpoint, if we save the UAR’s [United Arab 
Republic’s] bacon, the Soviets would gain by our act. In my view, Soviet-U.S. relations are the 
overriding concern. Therefore, the overriding question is: Who gains?”176 On another occasion, 
Nixon stated to Rabin: “I told you before to give it to them [the Egyptians and Russians] and to 
hit them as hard as you can. Every time I hear that you go at them, penetrate into their territory, I 
am delighted. As far as they are concerned, go ahead and hit them. The trouble is the rest of the 
Arabs. I very strongly believe that you are right, they are testing both you and us and we have to 
enable you to deter them.”177 Although U.S. and Israeli threat perceptions began to converge, the 
Nixon administration’s desire to maintain positive relations with the Arab world and to maintain 
the balance of power prevented additional U.S. arms transfers. 
Beginning in April 1970, U.S. intelligence began to indicate that growing Soviet 
involvement in the region would soon shift the balance of power against Israel. As part of the 
War of Attrition, the Soviets had given surface-to-air missiles (SAMs) to Egypt, 10,000 Soviet 
advisers and deployed Soviet combat pilots to fly over the Egyptian mainland. The United States 
had to rethink its initial reluctance to offer Israel arms. As Soviet involvement in the fighting 
deepened, Israel requested electronic counter-measures from the United States.178 Designed to 
neutralize Soviet SAMs in Egypt, the electronic counter-measures would have provided “Israel 
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the ability to mount deep raids against Soviet manned targets in Egypt.”179 Moreover, Israel 
sought drones and RF-4Cs, which were Phantoms repurposed to engage in reconnaissance 
missions. 180  The Nixon administration agreed to give an anti-missile package and thus 
“compensate Israel for the military advantage gained by [Egypt] and Soviets [sic] as a result of 
the improvements in their dispositions west of the Suez Canal.”181 When Egypt violated a cease-
fire agreement, Nixon promised Israel additional military equipment as a “riposte to ceasefire 
violations.” 182  He expressed his keenness to “offset the military advantages gained by 
[Egypt].”183 Indeed, U.S. decisionmakers linked the necessity of giving these arms to the 
changing balance of power in the region. As Secretary of Defense William Rogers wrote to 
Nixon: 
Your decision…to hold in abeyance Israel’s request for additional aircraft was based on 
the judgment that Israel’s qualitative superiority compensated amply for its numerical 
inferiority in planes. The direct Soviet involvement in an operational role has injected a 
new qualitative capacity and a reinforced quantitative capacity on the UAR side. In 
short, the intelligence evaluations indicate that the weight of the Soviet presence has 
already reduced the material and psychological advantages previously enjoyed by the 
Israelis. Fundamentally, the Arab-Israeli military balance now depends on Soviet 
actions and decisions which have already created a situation in which Israel’s air 
superiority could be rapidly neutralized. 184 
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Still, some U.S. decision-makers criticized the provision of arms transfers to Israel. Secretary of 
Defense Melvin Laird, for example, argued that the United States should not provide Israel with 
a “deep penetration raid capability.”185 By contrast, Kissinger reasoned that providing offensive 
weapons of the sort described above had a pacifying effect because “the provision of more 
security to Israel to enable her to cope with the Egyptians would be the factor most likely to deter 
Israeli thoughts of attack.” 186  These disagreements notwithstanding, U.S. decisionmakers 
consistently drew on their assessments of the current and projected local balance of power to 
determine whether Israel had sufficient deterrent capabilities and, by extension, whether Israel 
required new arms. 
Kissinger’s memos to Nixon indicate that Kissinger believed that it was unproductive to 
restrict arms sales to Israel to pursue better relations with the Soviet Union and its clients.187 
Concerned about direct Soviet involvement and impressed with Israel’s performance during the 
Jordan crisis, in which Israel supported the United States and the Hashemite monarchy against 
the Palestinian Liberation Organization, Kizzinger told Nixon that Israel’s interests were more 
compatible with U.S. interests than previously believed. Arguing that the State Department 
policy had “backfired,” Kissinger believed that Israel’s military superiority should be restored 
with a supply of additional arms and reassurances.188 In a December 1970 memorandum written 
for Nixon, Kissinger noted “the progress the Soviet Union has recently made toward establishing 
hegemony in the [Middle East],” and observed that “the Soviets have…substantially increased 
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their military presence in the region.”189 Consequently, Nixon approved an arms package worth 
$90 million to Israel based on Kissinger’s assessment. The transfer was costly in its scope, nature, 
and promise for more institutionalized arms transfers, comprising anti-tank weapons and 
reconnaissance aircraft, among other items. Still, Israel wanted more, including a guaranteed 
supply of high-performance aircraft (54 F-4As and 120 A-4s) and “long-term agreements that 
would prevent the periodic supply disruptions and quarrels that had marked the previous two 
years.”190 
With Nasser’s death in September 1970 and the ascendancy of Anwar el-Sadat to the 
Egyptian presidency, the Nixon administration sensed an opportunity to break the stalemate in 
the Arab-Israeli conflict. Yet Israel proved obstinate despite Sadat’s overtures to the United 
States. Nixon lamented, “We cannot be in a position where we [continue to provide aid] and 
Israel says we won’t talk. …That’s what it gets down to.”191
 
At an NSC meeting, Nixon 
emphasized that “we will go all way the way with Israel in maintaining the balance of power in 
its favor. …[The Israelis] assume that the U.S. will see them through regardless of what they do. 
This is not true.”192 In May 1971, Nixon wrote to Secretary of State Rogers that “it is essential 
that no more aid programs for Israel be approved until they agree to some kind of interim action 
on the Suez or some other issue.”193
 
Even when Sadat signed a new treaty with the Soviet Union 
that same month, Nixon and Rogers left U.S. policy unchanged, arguing that a defense pact with 
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Israel would have “all sorts of problems.”194 Nixon withheld additional military aid transfers to 
Israel throughout much of 1971.195
 
This policy irked Kissinger, who argued that the military 
balance of power was tilting against Israel so that it needed a steady flow of arms.196 
In November 1971, the U.S. government conducted a major assessment of the balance of 
power in the region. It noted that although Israel had maintained its qualitative advantage, two 
developments threatened Israel’s position. First, “the shift in the balance that has taken place as a 
result of the Soviet-installed defense capability mainly affects Israel’s pre-emptive strike 
capability…[which] is important to Israel because it deprives Israel of the ability to impose a 
short war.”197 Second, the “continuing buildup in the USSR’s own position in Egypt,” since it 
“improve[d] Soviet capability against the U.S. and even, in an extreme situation, against 
Israel.”198 As Kissinger concluded, “Everyone here admits that that Israel will need more planes 
over a 1-3 year span to continue normal modernization and upgrading of its air force. The main 
question is when those planes will be provided and in what political context.”199 In November 
1971, Washington agreed to provide a new costly transfer of arms to Israel that would allow 
Israel to maintain its superiority for the years to come.200 
The steady growth in U.S. military assistance to Israel continued in the next two years. 
Some opportunities to break the impasse between Israel and its Arab neighbors seemed possible. 
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Sadat expelled Soviet military advisers from Egypt in 1972. Still, the Soviet Union continued to 
make large arms transfers to other Arab clients such as Syria.201 More importantly, the peace 
overtures that Sadat made toward Israel at this time went nowhere. Israel was not ready to 
surrender the Sinai Peninsula and, skeptical of the overtures, Kissinger dismissed Sadat’s last 
major attempt for peace in February 1973 as “far-reaching but one-sided.”202 The following 
month, Israel made another major request for fighter jets. Nixon was initially ambivalent but 
soon supported Kissinger’s position. Kissinger maintained that the military balance was tilting 
against Israel, adding that “only if the Arabs saw the Soviet arms did not hold the promise of a 
military solution would they turn to diplomacy in a serious way.”203 This policy developed 
despite Secretary of Defense Elliott Richardson’s assertions that Israel still enjoyed a 
geostrategic advantage, thereby justifying a more evenhanded U.S. approach to the region.204 In 
the end, the Nixon administration made the promised Phantom and Skyhawk deliveries, fulfilling 
Israel’s requirements for the next four years.205  
Notwithstanding U.S. efforts to augment Israel’s deterrent capabilities, Egypt and Syria 
coordinated a surprise attack on Israel in October 1973. This war sparked a fierce debate within 
the Nixon administration and the U.S. Congress over whether to supply significant military aid. 
But with heavy Israeli losses, mounting domestic pressure, a massive Soviet resupply effort, and 
Sadat’s rejection of a ceasefire, this debate became moot. Nixon sought a congressional 
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appropriation for a massive $2.2 billion airlift to help Israel prevail in the war.206 The 1973 war 
provided an opportunity for the United States to strengthen Arab relations, especially with Egypt, 
and take a leading role in postwar negotiations—a task made all the more urgent because of the 
Arab oil embargo. Still, Israel remained desperate for a long-term U.S. arms commitment, 
forcing Washington into a dilemma about how to reassure both sides.  
SUMMARY AND ALTERNATIVE ARGUMENTS  
During the Kennedy, Johnson, and Nixon administrations, U.S. decisionmakers used two 
primary indicators to determine whether to offer Israel an alliance commitment or costly arms: 
the extent to which Israel and the United States had compatible security interests, and whether 
the current and projected military balance suggested that Israel could deter and defeat its 
adversaries. Because United States never truly shared Israel’s sense of threat, it was concerned 
that an alliance commitment would jeopardize its broader regional interests, particularly its 
desire for stronger ties with Arab states. U.S. assessments of Israel’s relative military capabilities 
varied during this time period. Much debate took place over Israel’s projected military 
capabilities and its ability to maintain qualitative superiority over Arab neighbors in the absence 
of costly arms transfers and in the presence of a growingly assertive Soviet patron. Those who 
argued that Israel’s military superiority could not be sustained without significant U.S. assistance, 
such as Kissinger, often suggested more costly transfers. Those who believed in Israel’s ability to 
maintain superiority even without significant assistance argued against continuous and 
unconditional support. The magnitude of U.S. arms transfers increased after 1968 in response to 
growing Soviet involvement in the region and the anticipated effect it would have on the balance 
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of power in the region. The objective of U.S. assistance during the remainder of the 1970s was 
“to sustain Israeli military superiority,” according to a secret NSC memo.207  
Table 4: Summary of predictions and evidence for Israel 
 values of independent 
variables 
predicted value of 
dependent variable 
observed value of 
dependent variable 
1961-68 U.S. assessment: somewhat 
compatible security interests; 
favorable Israeli capabilities 
vis-à-vis Arab neighbors 
provision of neither 
costly arms nor defense 
pact 
provision of minimal 
costly arms, without 
defense pact 
1969-73 U.S. assessment: somewhat 
compatible security interests; 
unfavorable Israeli 
capabilities vis-à-vis Arab 
neighbors 
provision of costly arms 
without unconditional 
defense pact 
provision of costly arms 
without unconditional 
defense pact 
 
patron’s assessment of client’s relative current and projected 
military capability vis-à-vis adversary  
unfavorable favorable 
patron’s 
assessment of 
compatibility 
of security 
interests 
highly 
compatible  
provision of both costly arms 
and defense pact 
 provision of defense pact 
without costly arms 
 somewhat 
compatible 
provision of costly arms 
without unconditional 
defense pact  
provision of neither costly 
arms nor defense pact 
 
Critics may assert that domestic politics shaped U.S. commitments to Israel, yet the evidence in 
support of this alternative explanation is weak during the period we examine. The pattern of arms 
transfers during the Johnson administration represents a most-likely case for domestic political 
explanations. The Democratic Party captured most of the Jewish vote in the 1960s, and pro-Israel 
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members of Congress pressed the administration to meet Israeli demands.208 Nevertheless, 
domestic pressures did not convince Johnson to offer Israel a formal defense pact, a nuclear 
security guarantee, or even a long-term arms commitment. Moreover, rarely did U.S. 
decisionmakers allude to U.S. domestic politics in their arms transfer reasoning. Some 
transactions—such as the Phantoms in 1968—do offer admittedly mixed evidence for our theory. 
Nevertheless, the domestic factor should not be overstated. Johnson hesitated, and his delay 
reflected several strategic considerations: first, the Soviets were increasing their support to 
Egypt; and second, Israel offered an important concession by renewing its pledge not to 
introduce nuclear weapons into the region. During the Nixon years, notwithstanding high 
domestic support for Israel, U.S. policies still exhibited significant fluctuations. Moreover, 
throughout this period decisionmakers privately discussing geostrategic factors, specifically the 
evolving local military balance of power, in their deliberations over whether to transfer arms to 
the Jewish state.209 
 We do not find significant evidence favoring other alternative arguments. The 
commercial logic for arms transfers is not supported by the documentary evidence, nor is the 
rationale that U.S. decisionmakers wished to recoup production costs by selling additional 
aircraft to Israel. Discussions involving the production line sometimes appear in the documentary 
record, but only because U.S. decisionmakers were unsure whether they could fulfill Israeli 
requests within a particular time frame. Occasionally, Israel’s requests for advanced aircraft 
required U.S. inventory, thereby adversely affecting U.S. capabilities.  
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Finally, the documents reveal that U.S. decisionmakers often discussed using arms to get 
leverage with Israel.210 That these discussions took place does not validate this alternative 
argument because U.S. decisionmakers recognized the difficulties associated with using arms for 
such purposes. On the one hand, they feared that withholding aid would make Israel anxious and 
aggressive while emboldening the Soviet Union and its Middle Eastern clients. On the other 
hand, they worried that giving military aid to Israel would antagonize Arab countries and invite 
further Soviet involvement. Moreover, a failed effort to influence Israel’s policies risked 
damaging the United States’ regional reputation. U.S. decisionmakers wrestled with these issues 
with little resolution.  
CONCLUSION 
This article has argued that great powers follow a clear strategic logic when deciding whether to 
ally with or give arms to client states. In contrast to previous studies, which claim that such 
decisions are shaped by domestic politics or commercial factors, we find that great powers signal 
reassurance while avoiding entrapment by relying on different bundles of security goods. Patrons 
assess the degree of shared threat and the local balances of capabilities in determining whether to 
support their clients with arms, alliance commitments, or both. This strategic logic helps to 
explain how great powers manage the “patron’s dilemma.” A wealth of primary documents 
provides strong empirical support for our theory in the cases of U.S. security commitments to 
Taiwan and Israel.  
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Table 5: Summary of argument 
 
U.S. assessment of client’s relative current and projected 
military capability vis-à-vis adversary  
unfavorable favorable 
U.S. 
assessment of 
commonality 
of security 
interests 
highly 
compatible  
Taiwan (1953-1972) 
receives both costly arms 
and a defense pact 
  
 somewhat 
compatible 
Israel (1968-1972) and 
Taiwan (1979-1982) receive 
costly arms without a 
defense pact  
Israel (1961-1968) receives 
neither costly arms nor a 
defense pact 
 
 Our argument provides numerous avenues for future research. First, our findings could be tested 
by applying our theory to additional patron-client relationships. Although our findings do not 
support the notion that domestic political considerations guided U.S. commitment choices, we 
readily acknowledge the potential influence of these factors. Future work could further theorize 
and test which types of foreign and security policies are most likely to be driven by domestic 
political or commercial logics rather than strategic considerations.211 Indeed, McManus and 
Yarhi-Milo show that while strategic concerns primarily influence which countries receive U.S. 
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signals of support, the regime type of the recipient has great influence on whether the signal is 
sent in public, such as an alliance or formal presidential visits, or in private, such as with arms 
sales and military aid. This difference in signaling strategies toward democratic versus autocratic 
states can be attributed to concerns over domestic backlash.212 
Second, further research could explore the strategic logic of a more comprehensive set of 
tools that patrons could use to manage security relations with their clients. We have shown that 
patrons use arms transfers and alliances to convey different forms of commitment. Yet it is 
possible that other tools should also be considered. Forward deployments of military assets, joint 
military exercises, and military basing are just some of the security tools that patrons could use 
as either complements or substitutes in supporting clients. 
Third, future work should evaluate the preferences and perceptions of client states and 
adversaries regarding arms transfers and alliances. In this article, we focus exclusively on the 
patron’s decisions, but what about those of the client or the client’s adversary? How do clients 
interpret the receipt of these security goods? Do potential aggressors perceive arms-only 
partnerships as signaling a weaker commitment than formal alliances? These are important 
questions that require further theorizing and empirical testing. 
Fourth, scholars should examine how patrons’ provision of arms and alliances affect 
crisis initiation or nuclear proliferation. Because Israel developed nuclear weapons and Taiwan 
had a nuclear program, it appears prima facie that conventional military arms did not eliminate 
their nuclear interests. Thus, in addition to delineating the range of policy tools at the disposal of 
patrons, researchers should examine their effects on extended deterrence.  
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 Our research has important practical implications for U.S. policy towards allies and 
partners in Asia, Europe, and the Middle East. Many states are facing growing challenges as 
China becomes increasingly assertive, Russia coerces its neighbors, and Iran pursues nuclear 
capabilities. The United States and its allies and partners must consider how to mitigate these 
risks collectively. Our research sheds light on the dilemmas U.S. decisionmakers are facing, and 
the types of commitments that they are likely to provide different states. Consider East Asia, 
where China’s rapid military modernization and increasingly assertive behavior will likely fuel 
the perception that the United States and many regional states have common security interests. 
We expect increased cooperation under existing alliances, such as that with Japan and the 
Philippines, and suggest that additional alignments are possible. For example, if domestic 
political opposition can be overcome, Vietnam could become a major security partner of the 
United States. With Vietnam in an unfavorable military position relative to China, arms transfers 
are possible, especially now that U.S. sales of lethal weapons to Vietnam are no longer banned. 
Accordingly, in June 2015, U.S. Secretary of Defense Ashton Carter announced a new 
“Southeast Asia Maritime Security Initiative” devoting $425 million to “capacity-building efforts” 
over the next five years.213 Assistant Secretary of Defense David Shear commented, “We’re 
looking at maritime security shortfalls among our partners and we will be ready to discuss with 
them what it is they need and how they expect to use it.”214 If China’s behavior continues to 
push the United States and Vietnam closer, we suggest that it is even possible that an extended 
U.S. deterrent commitment could emerge. In short, facing an increasingly capable and assertive 
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China, states in East Asia could receive increased arms transfers and in some cases expanded 
alliance commitments from the United States. 
 Russian activities in Eastern Europe pose a somewhat different challenge. Ukraine is far 
weaker than Russia, so our theory suggests that the United States is likely to provide arms to 
Ukraine. Indeed, in 2015, U.S. Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff Martin Dempsey 
recommended, “I think we should absolutely consider lethal aid and it ought to be in the context 
of NATO allies.” 215  A group of former senior U.S. officials, including NATO military 
commanders and officials, agreed: “The West needs to bolster deterrence in Ukraine. …That 
requires providing direct military assistance—in far larger amounts than provided to date and 
including lethal defensive arms.”216  Accordingly, the United States has provided military 
assistance to Ukraine, although most of this support has been categorized as non-lethal given 
NATO’s unwillingness to provide lethal arms. The lack of debate about incorporating Ukraine 
into NATO is also instructive. Our theory suggests that the withholding of NATO membership 
from Ukraine was the result of either the United States or Europe not viewing Russia as a 
common security concern. Indeed, in 2008, France and Germany blocked Ukraine’s membership, 
despite U.S. support. Thus, Washington has pursued other options, including joint military 
exercises, greater consultations, and military assistance. 
Lastly, in the Middle East, U.S. partners are facing a rare but not unprecedented situation. 
The United States shares concerns about Iran’s nuclear program with Israel, Saudi Arabia, and 
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the United Arab Emirates, among others. The 2015 negotiation and implementation of the Joint 
Comprehensive Plan of Action with Iran, however, might indicate a possible shift in U.S. 
perceptions about the commonality of security interests with Iran, and consequently, Iran’s 
regional adversaries. If such a transformation continues, then it would make a defense pact 
between the United States and Israel or Saudi Arabia less likely, but could lead the United States 
to provide Israel, Saudi Arabia, and others with even more defensive arms if  U.S. policymakers 
assess that Iran’s military capabilities are growing vis-à-vis its neighbors. 
